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JOHN BROWN’S CONSTITUTION 
Robert L. Tsai*
Abstract: It will surprise many Americans to learn that before John Brown 
and his men briefly captured Harpers Ferry, they authored and ratified a 
Provisional Constitution. This deliberative act built upon the achievements 
of the group to establish a Free Kansas, during which time Brown penned 
an analogue to the Declaration of Independence. These writings, coupled 
with Brown’s trial tactics after his arrest, cast doubts on claims that the 
man was a lunatic or on a suicide mission. Instead, they suggest that John 
Brown aimed to be a radical statesman, one who turned to extreme tactics 
but nevertheless remained committed to basic notions of democratic self-
rule. Rather than call Brown simply a terrorist or a common criminal, it is 
more accurate to understand him as a practitioner of “fringe constitution-
alism,” in which a patriot turns to unconventional, even violent tactics, on 
behalf of deep governing principles. Brown straddles traditional cultural 
and legal categories, taking advantage of such complexities in the name of 
constitutional transformation. 
In John Brown’s house, and in John Brown’s presence, men from widely dif-
ferent parts of the continent met and united into one company, wherein no 
hateful prejudice dared intrude its ugly self—no ghost of distinction found 
space to enter.1
Introduction 
 A year before John Brown embarked on his assault on Harpers 
Ferry that fateful October morning in 1859, he did a curious thing. 
Brown “called a quiet convention,” which commenced the morning of 
May 8, 1858, in Chatham, Canada. At the spring gathering, forty-six 
men strong, a draft “constitution was brought forward and, after a sol-
                                                                                                                      
* © 2010 Robert L. Tsai, Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of 
Law. The author thanks participants of the 2008 Maryland Discussion Group on Constitu-
tionalism and attendees of the Symposium Commemorating the 150th Anniversary of 
John Brown’s Raid on Harpers Ferry. Much was gained from discussions with Al Brophy, 
Garrett Epps, Jim Fleming, Amanda Frost, Mark Graber, Michelle McKinley, Fernanda 
Nicola, Howard Schweber, and Mark Tushnet. Chris Datskos, Judah Gluckman, and Emily 
Graefe provided fine editorial assistance. 
1 Osborne P. Anderson, A Voice from Harpers Ferry 23–24 (Boston 1861). 
151 
152 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:151 
emn parole of honor, was read.”2 The attendees, thirty-four blacks and 
twelve whites committed to the abolition of slavery, approved the vast 
majority of the articles after minor debate.3 That evening, they elected 
the officers created by the newly adopted governing instrument. To no 
one’s surprise, the convention tapped Brown for commander-in-chief.4 
Members of the convention elected two black men—Alfred Ellsworth 
and Osborne P. Anderson—as congressmen.5 Each man took his new 
title with him to Virginia as the group attempted to fulfill their constitu-
tional ambitions. 
 The John Brown movement’s defeat at Harpers Ferry put an end 
to its capacity to claim to know the best interests of the people. Once 
authorities stormed the federal armory and captured John Brown, the 
Commonwealth of Virginia charged him with treason, insurrection, 
and murder.6 From that point on, the document ratified by the Chat-
ham Convention assumed a central role in Brown’s trial. Each partici-
pant to the criminal proceedings had occasion to interpret the consti-
tution.7 The Commonwealth introduced the written instrument into 
evidence, arguing that the “Provisional Government was a real thing, 
and no debating society.”8 Prosecutors repeatedly pointed to the 
document as proof of a plan to subvert Virginia’s existing form of gov-
ernment, and therefore of Brown’s disloyalty.9
 Brown’s lawyers, too, wished to lean heavily on the Provisional 
Constitution to mount a vigorous defense by arguing that their client 
                                                                                                                      
2 W.E.B. Du Bois, John Brown 154 (David Roediger ed., Modern Library 2001) 
(1909). 
3 Hannah Geffert, They Heard His Call: The Local Black Community’s Involvement in the 
Raid on Harpers Ferry, in Terrible Swift Sword: The Legacy of John Brown 23, 27 (Peg-
gy A. Russo & Paul Finkelman eds., 2005). 
4 Provisional Const. and Ordinances for the People of the United States, arts. 
IV, XXX, reprinted in The Life, Trial and Execution of Captain John Brown 51–52 
(Robert M. De Witt ed., New York, Robert M. De Witt 1859) [hereinafter Provisional 
Const.] (creating two separate offices of president and commander-in-chief, the former 
elected and the second appointed); see infra app A. Some, including Frederick Douglass, 
report that Brown held both offices. See, e.g., Stephen B. Oates, To Purge This Land 
with Blood: A Biography of John Brown 246 (2d ed. 1984). The minutes of the Chat-
ham Convention show that on May 10, 1858, Thomas M. Kinnard was nominated for 
President, but declined the nomination. Anderson, supra note 1, at 12. J.W. Loguen’s 
name was then advanced, but “[t]he nomination was afterwards withdrawn, Mr. Loguen 
not being present, and it being announced that he would not serve if elected.” Id. 
5 Oates, supra note 4, at 246. 
6 The Life, Trial and Execution of Captain John Brown, supra note 4, at 59. 
7 See, e.g., id. at 72. 
8 Id. at 92. 
9 See id. 
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was insane at the time of his alleged offenses. Brown refused,10 leaving 
his attorneys to argue that the “pamphlet” taken from his body was 
proof only of a “harmless organization,” “a mere imaginary Govern-
ment to govern themselves, and nobody else.”11 In other words, while 
admitting Brown had undertaken some mobilization project, they 
played down its real world significance. This defense no doubt sounded 
feeble and difficult for jurors to credit, given Brown’s notoriety and the 
reports of violence at Harpers Ferry. 
 Thus, in a fascinating turn of events, both parties to the criminal 
action debated the scope and political significance of John Brown’s ex-
ercise in constitution writing. There may have been legal questions of 
culpability and punishment involved, but the very fate of the movement 
was on trial: its goals, methods, and legacy. Was the political community 
described therein real or purely fictive? And if the constitution was 
more than fantasy, did it constitute proof of a desire, as prosecutors ar-
gued, “to take possession of the Commonwealth and make it another 
Hayti[?]”12 Brown’s lawyers appeared to concede that the instrument 
represented some effort at self-organization, even if the charter lacked 
a number of features one might expect.13 This document and the 
events surrounding its writing, ratification, and portrayal at trial, re-
main surprisingly unexplored for its significance in light of democratic 
norms. If anything, the dominant scholarly assumption is that John 
Brown acted outside of the law, and that in doing so, he gave up any 
claim to participate as a democratic citizen. Thus, the literature depicts 
him as a terrorist or folk hero,14 martyr or madman—but rarely as a 
would-be statesman or founder.15
                                                                                                                      
 
10 Id. at 65 (noting that Brown said “I am perfectly unconscious of insanity, and I re-
ject, so far as I am capable, any attempt to interfere in my behalf on that score”) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
11 Id. at 86, 90. One of Brown’s lawyers, Mr. Chilton, could not help himself from as-
serting that the document amounted to “ridiculous nonsense—a wild, chimerical produc-
tion. It could only be produced by men of unsound minds.” Id. at 90. Even so, he argued 
that the document lacked the power to levy taxes, an essential element of any charter of 
government. Id. Brown’s defense strategies thus consisted of describing the Provisional 
Constitution as an internal policy document, or arguing that the group’s state-building 
aspirations were flawed or incomplete, or denying that any state-building motives were 
directed at the federal government, but not the state government. 
12 The Life, Trial and Execution of Captain John Brown, supra note 4, at 93. 
13 See, e.g., id. at 86–87, 90. 
14 Brown has been variously described as an “insurrectionist,” “insurgent,” and “hero.” 
See id. at 7, 30, 31; see also Oates, supra note 4, at vii–x (describing the polar views sur-
rounding Brown). One author has described him as the “father of American terrorism.” 
Ken Chowder, The Father of American Terrorism, American Heritage, Feb.–Mar. 2000, at 81, 
81. Those who wished to strip John Brown’s escapade of any higher purpose painted him 
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 This Essay challenges such presentations of the man, his tactics, 
and objectives by putting his act of constitution writing front and cen-
ter. Its purpose is to parse Brown’s legal and political ideas, to see if 
they can be squared with the American constitutional tradition. Once 
this is done, it will become apparent that the actions of the historical 
John Brown comprise an instance of “fringe constitutionalism.” 
 Practitioners of fringe constitutionalism advocate or employ extra-
legal tactics in the pursuit of socially transformative goals.16 How the 
processes of law and politics treat such individuals presents challenging 
issues of democratic citizenship. A fringe constitutionalist’s morally 
questionable or flatly illegal strategies provoke a society’s desire to ex-
clude such individuals in the name of self-preservation, to brand them 
as threats to the rule of law. Members of a governing regime seek to 
punish these persons, strip them of the aura of citizenship, and cast 
them as pretenders. 
 At the same time, what gives fringe constitutionalists a potential 
claim to democratic legitimacy is a steadfast refusal to renounce their 
membership in the polity. Through word and deed, such an individual 
chooses to converse with fellow citizens in democratic idioms, rail 
against the missteps or corruption of caretakers of communal ideals, 
and urge others onward toward democratic perfection.17 The fringe 
constitutionalist behaves like a rule breaker, but speaks like a law fol-
lower. In exploiting the categories of action and justification, the indi-
vidual invites others to view extreme tactics as proof of patriotism. By 
initiating the overthrow of one corrupting way of life, the radical hopes 
to create a more lasting democratic existence. For the vision to be a 
                                                                                                                      
as a common criminal who invaded Virginia “to murder the white men, women and chil-
dren.” Merrill D. Peterson, John Brown: The Legend Revisited 83 (2002) (quoting 
R.G. Horton, A Youth’s History of the Great Civil War in the United States, from 
1861 to 1865, at 61 (New York, Van Evrie, Horton & Co. 1867)); see also John Allen 
Wyeth, With Sabre and Scalpel: The Autobiography of a Soldier and Surgeon 94, 
124 (1914) (contending that Brown, a personal and professional failure, turned to murder 
and treason for selfish reasons). 
15 Consider the reaction of Salmon P. Chase, then the Governor of Ohio: “Poor old 
man! How sadly misled by his own imaginations! How rash—how mad—how criminal then 
to stir up insurrection which if successful would deluge the land with blood & make void 
the fairest hopes of mankind!” Letter from Salmon P. Chase to Joseph H. Barrett (Oct. 29, 
1859) in A John Brown Reader 249 (Louis Ruchames ed., 1959). 
16 See generally Susan P. Koniak, When Law Risks Madness, 8 Cardozo Stud. L. & Lit-
erature 65 (1996) (discussing how the Common Law Movement is a contemporary in-
stance of fringe constitutionalism). 
17 At the Chatham Convention, Brown reportedly unveiled his plan for military action 
because he wished to “enforce[] the doctrine of destroying the tree that bringeth [sic] 
forth corrupt fruit.” Anderson, supra note 1, at 10. 
2010] John Brown’s Constitution 155 
plausible one, construction must accompany destruction. But the very 
turn toward illegality or violence is fraught with risk for this political 
actor’s project, lest widespread disgust for extreme tactics drowns out 
legitimate grievances or empowers existing authorities to stifle oppor-
tunities for regime change. 
 Our initial task is to review John Brown’s Provisional Constitution 
and situate it among John Brown’s actions and philosophies, the Harp-
ers Ferry escapade, and his trial.18 Once historical preliminaries are 
reached, it then becomes possible to make some observations about the 
relationship between violence and law,19 as well as among the different 
strains of constitutionalism.20
I. A Provisional Constitution 
 An examination of the document titled “Provisional Constitution 
and Ordinances for the People of the United States” (“Provisional Con-
stitution”) refutes any suggestion that it is the work of a madman.21 The 
writing is crisp and the words carefully chosen. In many instances the 
language is more direct than the U.S. Constitution. The preamble la-
ments the nation’s addiction to slave labor, which has commenced “a 
most barbarous, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war of one portion of its 
citizens upon another portion.”22 Such a sustained act of aggression 
violated “eternal and self-evident truths set forth in our Declaration of 
Independence,” and justified a repudiation of the existing legal regime 
and the establishment of another, more perfect, order.23
 Accordingly: 
We, citizens of the United States, and the Oppressed People, 
who, by a recent decision of the Supreme Court are declared to 
have no rights which the White Man is bound to respect; to-
gether with all other people degraded by the laws thereof, Do, 
for the time being ordain and establish ourselves, the following 
Provisional Constitution and Ordinances, the better to 
protect our Persons, Property, Lives, and Liberties . . . .24
                                                                                                                      
18 See infra notes 21–73 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 74–122 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 123–170 and accompanying text. 
21 See Provisional Const.; Richard J. Hinton, John Brown and His Men app. at 
619–33 (Arno Press & The N.Y. Times 1968) (1894). 
22 Provisional Const. pmbl. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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In their generous usage of the inclusive “we” and the promiscuous co-
optation of the rhetoric of American liberation, the drafters announce 
themselves as a new coalition of insiders and outsiders committed to 
the public good. Throughout the document, reportedly drawn up in 
the house of Frederick Douglass,25 the group’s Christian utopian rheto-
ric is disciplined by the language of civic republicanism. 
 It is not a work of fantasy, but rather a sober governing document 
that tries to manage the problems of an as-yet unrealized, but worldly 
future and the imperatives of here and now. Despite repeated refer-
ences to the currently constituted “organization,” many of the provi-
sions express principles of governance that not only guided the group’s 
efforts to construct a new society, but also would bind the community as 
a whole should the John Brown movement succeed.26 Members of the 
“organization” wished to be seen as a temporary representation of “the 
people,” who simultaneously authorize a break in historical time and 
will reconstitute the political community. 
 Given Brown’s religious upbringing and the role religious beliefs 
played in shaping his attitude towards slavery,27 what is surprising is the 
extent to which constitutional language serves as the primary medium 
for communicating with fellow citizens. In this respect, the group’s 
commitment to the idea of a single, national people sets it apart from 
utopian societies that had no use for a national identity, rule of law val-
ues, or democratic institutions. Rather than retreat to a set of parochial 
norms in the face of manifest injustice, Brown’s company hoped to rec-
reate the nation’s founding experience. 
 A society remade through this text would express itself as radically 
egalitarian, neither separated by race, previous or current condition of 
servitude, or sex: 
All persons of mature age, whether Proscribed, oppressed, and 
enslaved Citizens, or of the Proscribed and oppressed races of 
the United States, who shall agree to sustain and enforce the 
Provisional Constitution and Ordinance of this organization, 
                                                                                                                      
25 E.g., Hannah Geffert, They Heard His Call, in Terrible Swift Sword, supra note 3, at 
27. 
26 See, e.g., Provisional Const. arts. XXVIII (property), XL (irregularities). 
27 See, e.g., Mark S. Weiner, Black Trials: Citizenship from the Beginnings of 
Slavery to the End of Caste 161–75 (2004) (describing Brown’s religious upbringing 
and its influences on his anti-slavery theology). Examining Brown’s writings, Weiner argues 
that the radical abolitionist adhered to a coherent jurisprudence with three main ele-
ments: a theory of religious legitimacy, a theory of civic emasculation, and an account of 
legal deliverance as redress. Id. at 165–69. 
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together with all minor children of such persons, shall be held 
to be fully entitled to protection under the same.28
The only distinction hinted at is between “mature” persons and “minor 
children.” Their goal was not “expatriation,” as David Reynolds points 
out, but rather “integration.”29 Hence, the community’s aspirations set 
it apart from those espousing white supremacy, on the one hand, and 
those advocating early strains of black separatism, on the other. 
 Beyond the predominant ethic of equality, the chief organizing 
trait is the priority of work—honest labor, shared by all, for the good of 
all.30 In exchange for the protections afforded by the state, each person 
is obligated by the basic law to “labor in some way for the general good” 
or risk sanction.31 Brown himself stated that “all great reforms, like the 
Christian religion, were based on broad, generous, self-sacrificing prin-
ciples.”32 The centrality of labor relations to the Provisional Constitu-
tion reflected more than Christian virtue—it also epitomized a rising 
concern about labor in organized society. Accordingly, his band of anti-
slavery activists and fighters were “organized on a less selfish basis” than 
prevailing forms of civic life.33
 Here and there optimistic, somewhat fanciful, elements can be 
found. Article III falls into this category: It provides that Congress shall 
consist of at least five but no more than ten members.34 It is little more 
than an effort to recapture a limited government more suitable to a 
pastoral society. This idiosyncratic feature aside, post-slavery America 
would continue to be governed according to a tripartite government by 
officers whose titles and responsibilities would be recognizable to the 
common man.35
 A number of other wrinkles stand out. Brown and his followers 
believed in strict term limits for non-judicial officers. The President and 
Vice-President are limited to single three-year terms of office, and are 
to be selected not by an Electoral College, but through election by “the 
citizens or members of this organization.”36 The Senate would be abol-
                                                                                                                      
28 Provisional Const. art. I. 
29 David S. Reynolds, John Brown, Abolitionist 114 (2005). 
30 Provisional Const. art. XXXIX. 
31 Id. By all accounts, Brown was raised with Puritan values and conducted himself in 
ways that prompted the descriptions “austere,” “stern,” and “unyielding.” See, e.g., Du Bois, 
supra note 2, at 14–18. 
32 Du Bois, supra note 2, at 99 (internal quotation omitted). 
33 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
34 Provisional Const. art. III. 
35 Id. arts. II, III, IV. 
36 Id. art. IV. 
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ished in favor of a single “Congress or House of Representatives.”37 
These departures from the Constitution of 1787 reflect suspicions 
among abolitionists, which Brown shared, that certain aristocratic fea-
tures of the Constitution had allowed slavery to flourish and aided the 
forces of racial domination, even though the Framers’ original docu-
ment never explicitly enshrined the institution.38
 Even more intriguing, the members of the five-member Supreme 
Court (five in total, including a Chief Justice) would be elected by the 
citizenry rather than appointed, and there is no explicit provision pro-
viding for life tenure based on good behavior.39 A separate provision 
authorizes: “Any member of the Supreme Court [may also be im-
peached,] tried, convicted, or punished by removal or otherwise . . . .”40 
It appeared to be an open question how long judges may serve and on 
what conditions they might be removed. 
 As for the Judiciary’s sphere of authority, the cumbersome lan-
guage of Article III of the U.S. Constitution is bypassed in favor of a 
single statement conferring general jurisdiction except in cases involv-
                                                                                                                      
37 Id. art. III. Article III provides that: 
The legislative branch shall be a Congress or House of Representatives, com-
posed of not less than five, nor more than ten members, who shall be elected 
by all citizens of mature age and of sound mind, connected with this organi-
zation; and who shall remain in office for three years, unless sooner removed 
for misconduct, inability, or by death. A majority of such members shall con-
stitute a quorum. 
Id. 
38 See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 29, at 96, 251. 
39 Provisional Const. art. V (spelling out the office of the “Chief Justice” and specify-
ing the number of Justices arguably make such provisions difficult to abolish or amend). 
40 Compare id. art. XV, with id. art. XIV. Article XV provides that: 
Any member of the Supreme Court tried, convicted, or punished by removal 
or otherwise, on complaint to the President, who shall, in such case, preside; 
the Vice-President, House of Representatives, and other members of the Su-
preme Court, constituting the proper tribunal (with power to fill vacancies); 
on complaint of a majority of said House of Representatives, or of the Su-
preme Court; a majority of the whole having power to decide. 
Id. art. XV. Article XIV provides that: 
The members of the House of Representatives may any and all of them be 
tried, and on conviction, removed or punished, on complaint before the 
Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court, made by any number of the members of 
said House, exceeding one-third, which House, with the Vice-President and 
Associate Judges of the Supreme Court, shall constitute the proper tribunal, 
with power to fill such vacancies. 
Id. art. XIV. 
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ing “the Rules of War.”41 Once the convention anchored all national 
officers in direct election, concerns of judicial overreaching waned; 
hence, no effort to create courts of limited jurisdiction. Brown’s re-
sponse to the Dred Scott decision, then, was more nuanced and institu-
tionally conservative than one might expect. Instead of abolishing the 
judiciary, turning its power over to another institution, or severely cur-
tailing its jurisdiction, the John Brown movement remained committed 
to judicial review so long as judges remained subject to removal 
through impeachment. 
 As it turns out, the Provisional Constitution is aspirational but also 
concrete. Religion and family life would be given places of honor.42 
The repeated mention of marriage, family, and religion stands in stark 
contrast to the U.S. Constitution, which makes no general commitment 
to marriage or family (these being judge-read rights) and makes highly 
specific mentions of religion (both a negative command forbidding the 
establishment of religion as well as an affirmative protection of reli-
gious exercise).43 According to John Brown’s Provisional Constitution, 
marriage would have to be “respected,” and the hours of the Sabbath 
spent on religious instruction, the education of the less fortunate, or 
some other form of personal improvement.44
 These features are reminiscent of Haiti’s 1801 and 1805 Constitu-
tions. The former, authored by the slave leader Touissant L’Ouverture, 
established a free society based on Catholicism45 and marriage, a “civil 
and religious institution . . . distinguished and specially protected by the 
government.”46 The version approved four years later affirmed “free-
dom of worship” and renounced a “predominant religion” within the 
nation, while asserting that a “Haitian” must be “a good father, good 
son, a good husband, and especially a good soldier.”47 John Brown, re-
portedly impressed with L’Ouverture’s successful slave revolt, may well 
have been influenced by Haiti’s constitution-writing experience.48
                                                                                                                      
41 Id. art. V. 
42 See id. art. XLII. 
43 See U.S. Const. amend. I. 
44 Provisional Const. art. XLII. 
45 Constitution d’Haïti tit. III, art. 6 (1801). 
46 Id. tit. IV, art. 9. Article 10 declared: “Divorce will not take place in the colony.” Id. 
tit. IV, art. 10. See generally C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture 
and the San Domingo Revolution (2d ed. rev. 1989) (describing the Haitian slave re-
volt). 
47 Constitution d’Haïti arts. 9, 50–51 (1805). 
48 Reynolds, supra note 29, at 107–08. 
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 The Provisional Constitution uses the term “rights” exactly twice in 
passing and does not separately enumerate them.49 Instead, it freely 
employs the word “duty.”50 A number of “protections” afforded by the 
instrument will seem enlightened, even to the modern mind. The hu-
mane treatment of prisoners is expressly required by the Provisional 
Constitution.51 Indeed, Article XXXII is surprisingly progressive in how 
far beyond contemporary protections it goes: 
No person, after having surrendered himself or herself a pris-
oner . . . shall afterward be put to death, or be subject to any 
corporeal punishment, without first having had the benefit of 
a fair and impartial trial; nor shall any prisoner be treated 
with any kind of cruelty, disrespect, insult, or needless severity; 
but it shall be the duty of all persons, male and female, con-
nected herewith, at all times and under all circumstances, to 
treat all such prisoners with every degree of respect and kind-
ness that the nature of the circumstances will admit of; and to 
insist on a like course of conduct from all others, as in the fear 
of Almighty God, to whose care and keeping we commit our 
cause.52
The document protects female prisoners against “forcible violation” by 
mandating the death penalty for the offense. Otherwise, it authorizes 
capital punishment for only a handful of crimes.53 In comparison, the 
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution bars only “cruel and unusual 
punishment,” presumably permitting some forms of state violence that 
might insult, annoy, or even inflict some measure of pain.54
 A spirit of conservation animates the Provisional Constitution, no 
doubt influenced by the scarcity of food, munitions, and supplies faced 
by the organization, as well as by its members’ attitudes towards the en-
vironment: “[N]eedless waste or destruction of any useful property . . . 
shall not be tolerated at any time or place . . . .”55 The document fur-
                                                                                                                      
49 The word “right” appears in the preamble’s description of the Dred Scott decision 
and in Article XXVII in describing the “right” of civil officers and others to the general 
protection of the military. Provisional Const. pmbl., art. XXVII. 
50 E.g., id. arts. XII, XVII, XXVII. 
51 Id. art. XXXII. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. art. XLI. The only death-eligible crimes are: desertion or treason, taking up arms 
against the community after “having been set at liberty on parole of honor,” and rape of a 
female prisoner. Id. arts. XXXVII, XXXVIII, XLI. 
54 See U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 
55 Provisional Const. art. XXXV. 
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ther bans the “needless” killing of animals.56 Although they could 
hardly be called environmentalists in any modern sense, members of 
the movement found it worthwhile to convert private notions of frugal-
ity into public values. 
 The instrument eschews a general commitment to freedom of 
speech, much less an absolutist one. Instead, “[p]rofane swearing, filthy 
conversation, indecent behavior, or indecent exposure of the person, 
or . . . quarreling” are all prohibited.57 Laying Article XL side by side 
with the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reveals the socially 
conservative strain of the group’s precepts, as well as its general sense 
that liberties need not be spelled out to be honored.58
 Despite the preamble’s mention of “liberties,” the document’s 
primary focus is the articulation of obligations citizens owe to one an-
other rather than individual rights, underscoring its republican charac-
ter.59 This approach is also true of the Provisional Constitution’s pro-
tection of gun use, which characterizes it less as an entitlement than as 
a suggestion that citizens be “encouraged to carry arms openly.”60 In 
one respect, the Provisional Constitution’s protection of guns is facially 
broader than the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and a 
number of state constitutions, as it is not tied to the existence of a “mili-
tia” nor is it limited to “self defense.”61 In other respects, the right to 
own or use a gun is subject to certain conditions: “good character, and 
. . . sound mind and suitable age,”62 with concealed weapons further 
limited to certain constitutional office-holders.63 Even a radical de-
fender of gun possession such as John Brown envisioned that the privi-
lege would not be unlimited. 
 The general tenor of the instrument, as well as the word choices 
throughout, indicate that it would be updated at some later date, 
though no procedure for amendment is provided.64 The Chatham at-
tendees were so confident of the ideas of popular sovereignty upon 
                                                                                                                      
56 Id. 
57 Id. art. XL (providing that “[p]rofane swearing, filthy conversation, indecent behav-
ior, or indecent exposure of the person, or intoxication or quarreling, shall not be allowed 
or tolerated; neither unlawful intercourse of the sexes”). 
58 Compare id. art. XL, with U.S. Const. amend I. 
59 See, e.g., Provisional Const. arts. XXVIII, XXXIX, XLII. 
60 Id. art. XLIII. 
61 See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. II; Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 
(2008) (reading the Second Amendment to articulate an individual, rather than a group 
right, to possess a gun). 
62 Provisional Const. art. XLIII. 
63 Id. art. XLIV. 
64 Cf. U.S. Const. art. V (outlining the procedure for amending the Constitution). 
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which they drew that not even the people’s ultimate power of revision is 
explicitly reserved in the document. The charter’s “Provisional” status, 
concern for the “confiscation” of property, the respectful treatment of 
“neutrals” and tough treatment of “deserters,” the proper procedure 
for court martial, and the status of individuals who take up arms against 
the anti-slavery cause after being granted “parole of honor” all reflect 
the group’s sense that they found themselves in a state of “war” against 
slavery.65 Members of the convention could imagine a new world with-
out human subjugation, but it existed then only in embryonic form. 
 The Provisional Constitution had precursors, just as the U.S. Con-
stitution was preceded by a Declaration of Independence and the Arti-
cles of Confederation.66 In the summer of 1856, thirty-five men gath-
ered with Brown in the forests of Kansas and adopted a covenant, 
pledging themselves and their “sacred honor” to “the maintenance of 
the rights and liberties of the Free State citizens of Kansas.”67 Bylaws 
were added, providing for the election of officers, the handling and 
disposal of booty, trial by jury, and barring profane, uncivil, drunken, 
or disorderly conduct, as well as theft and waste.68 Majority rule deter-
mined who would become an officer as well as who would sit on a jury 
of twelve to adjudicate alleged offenses.69 As evidence of an effort to 
establish a more lasting community, parties to the covenant bound 
themselves by requiring a supermajority (two-thirds) to amend or alter 
any of the articles.70
 The covenant proved to be a simple governing text, enforced at 
campfires and in relations between the self-described freedom fighters. 
Yet it amounted to an early instance of self-governance through writing, 
and one that inspired the Chatham Convention two years later. On or 
about this time, Brown also composed a document titled, “A Declara-
tion of Liberty by the Representatives of the Slave Population of the 
                                                                                                                      
65 See, e.g., Provisional Const. arts. XXVIII, XXXIV, XXXVIII. 
66 See generally Articles of Confederation of 1781; The Declaration of Independ-
ence (U.S. 1776). 
67 John Brown’s Covenant for the Enlistment of His Volunteer-Regular Company (Aug. 
1856), reprinted in Oswald Garrison Villard, John Brown, 1800–1859: A Biography 
Fifty Years After app. B, at 661–64 (Peter Smith 1966) (1910) [hereinafter John Brown’s 
Covenant]; see infra app. B. 
68 See John Brown’s Covenant. 
69 Id. at 662–63. 
70 Id. at 664. 
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United States of America,” laying out the legal authority for breaking 
from the Constitution of 1787.71
 It should come as little surprise, then, that John Brown refused to 
allow his lawyers to point to the Provisional Constitution as evidence of 
insanity. In the cool reflection that jail presented, Brown rejected the 
opportunity afforded by the law to participate in the public discrediting 
of his inchoate political enterprise. To claim insanity—and to discredit 
the document in the process—would by his own hand render the Provi-
sional Constitution the scribblings of a single man rather than the con-
sidered judgment of many virtuous citizens gathering out-of-doors.72 It 
would turn the ideals expressed therein into incoherent, mad babbling 
instead of a principled exercise of public reason.73 Opting for that trial 
strategy would destroy any political significance the document could 
have for Brown’s state-building aspirations. This tactical choice, then, is 
pregnant with communicative significance, and more than that— consti-
tutional significance. 
II. The Relationship Between Force and Constitutionalism 
 Ultimately, one cannot escape John Brown’s willingness to employ 
violence, and the relationship between force and constitutionalism. 
Two matters must be untangled from each other. The first question 
concerns the intentions of the historical John Brown, which calls for 
sifting through credible accounts of his plans. The second is a theoreti-
cal inquiry, one that requires an examination of the sacred and secular 
traditions invoked by this historical figure. 
                                                                                                                      
71 A Declaration of Liberty by the Representatives of the Slave Population of 
the United States of America, reprinted in Hinton, supra note 21, app. at 637–43 [here-
inafter Declaration of Liberty]; see infra app. C; see also infra notes 107–109 and accom-
panying text. 
72 See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, at 
319–28 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1972) (1969) (defining “out-of-doors” as deliberations tran-
spiring outside of the legal representative institutions and illustrating this term with exam-
ples from the American Revolutionary era). 
73 The importance of this portrayal of the gathering at Chatham and the subsequent 
raid was not lost on Brown’s supporters. Consider this description of the men solemnly 
gathered to ratify the Provisional Constitution: 
So many intellectual looking men are seldom seen in one party, and at the same 
time, such utter disregard of prevailing custom, or style, in dress and other little 
conventionalities. Hour after hour they would sit in council, thoughtful, ready; 
some of them eloquent, all fearless, patient of the fatigues of business; anon, 
here and there over the “track,” and again in the assembly . . . .” 
Anderson, supra note 1, at 14. 
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 As to the first matter, despite Brown’s war rhetoric and his repeated 
statements that it was no longer time for talk but for action, he neverthe-
less tried to temper the use of force.74 This calibrated resort to violence 
served a dialogic function. Brown repeatedly cited “The Golden Rule,” a 
principle of temperance against his enemies he derived from Jesus’s ex-
ample.75 He apparently urged his men repeatedly not to fire unless fired 
upon,76 and demanded that prisoners be treated well.77 During his in-
terrogation and even at trial, Brown consistently stated his design “to 
free the slaves, and only that.”78 His legal position accords with Article 
XLVI of the Provisional Constitution, titled, “These articles not for the 
overthrow of government”: 
The foregoing articles shall not be construed so as in any way 
to encourage the overthrow of any State government, or of 
the general government of the United States, and look to no 
dissolution of the Union, but simply to amendment and re-
peal. And our flag shall be the same that our fathers fought 
under in the Revolution.79
 It is a surprising disclaimer, one that might strike some observers as 
little more than a premeditated gambit to avoid criminal liability should 
the assault on Harpers Ferry end in failure but not death. It was appar-
ently the only provision that generated significant debate at Chatham, 
with Brown speaking out strongly in favor of its adoption.80 Some mem-
                                                                                                                      
74 See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 29, at 104, 150–51. 
75 Brown’s Interview with Mason, Vallandigham, and Others, in A John Brown Read-
er, supra note 15, at 119–20. 
76 Brown’s charge to the group before it set off for Harpers Ferry included this one: 
And now, gentlemen, let me impress this one thing upon your minds. You all 
know how dear life is to you, and how dear your life is to your friends. And in 
remembering that, consider that the lives of others are as dear to them as yours 
are to you. Do not, therefore, take the life of any one, if you can possibly avoid 
it; but if it is necessary to take life in order to save your own, then make sure 
work of it. 
Anderson, supra note 1, at 28–29 (internal quotation omitted). It is hard to believe that 
Anderson could remember Brown’s message verbatim, but is possible that he gets the gist 
of it correct, especially given other corroborating evidence that Brown advocated a princi-
ple of moderation in the group’s use of force. 
77 See The Life, Trial and Execution of Captain John Brown, supra note 4, at 37. 
78 Brown’s Interview with Mason, Vallandigham, and Others, supra note 75, at 119. Val-
landigham asked: “Did you expect a general rising of the slaves in case of your success?” 
Brown answered: “No, sir; nor did I wish it. I expected to gather them up from time to 
time and set them free.” Id. at 123. 
79 Provisional Const. art. XLVI. 
80 Reynolds, supra note 29, at 263–64. 
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bers of the organization surely hoped for revolt or the outbreak of war, 
and may have been far more disillusioned than others regarding the 
nation’s ideals. By insisting upon the provision, their new commander-
in-chief demanded a group commitment to work within the American 
tradition of creative “amendment and repeal” rather than to levy a gen-
eral war against the United States or pro-slavery states.81
 If the revolutionary’s interest lay in commencing a general war or 
leading a conventional insurrection, then this type of forbearance 
would be patently unnecessary. Indeed, for the prototypical terrorist, 
going to violent extremes is important to reveal the alleged powerless-
ness and depravity of a regime. By contrast, Brown’s preoccupation 
with limiting violence to morally justifiable targets seemed calculated to 
not only influence public debate, but also to preserve his residual ca-
pacity to speak as a member of the political community. No doubt cer-
tain opponents and defenders would recoil at the violence and try to 
deny him that opportunity. Brown’s gamble was that by adhering to 
some principle of moderation, the movement’s tactics would be over-
looked, their commitment demonstrated for all to see, and the consti-
tutionality of slavery placed at the center of public debate. 
 A modern example may be instructive. In The Revolt, Menachem 
Begin claims that a member of the Irgun telephoned the King David 
Hotel before the bomb went off on July 22, 1946, so that employees of 
the hotel could evacuate civilians.82 Whether or not the call was made, 
what appears unassailable is that, judging from the reactions, anyone 
with pretensions to participate in self-government must abide by a 
principle of moderation, lest he lose forever the moral high ground. 
Indiscriminate killing of innocents violates this principle. The Irgun’s 
                                                                                                                      
81 By contrast, Mark Weiner acknowledges that the Provisional Constitution “mak[es] 
plain [John Brown’s] desire to redeem the nation rather than destroy it,” but believes 
Harpers Ferry to be the beginning of a “military campaign that would sweep the South, 
destroying slavery at the end of the sword.” Weiner, supra note 27, at 173. On this inter-
pretation, the Blue Ridge Mountains consist of little more than a temporary locale from 
which to launch further incursions into the South. 
82 Menachem Begin, The Revolt 219 (Nash Publ’g 1972) (1948). The Irgun Zvai 
Leumi was a militant group that used acts of violence targeted at the British in order to 
gain Israeli independence. Walter Enders & Todd Sandler, The Political Economy 
of Terrorism 16 (2006). Menachem Begin was the leader of the Irgun and later served as 
Israel’s prime minister. Begin, supra, at viii. Begin devotes an entire chapter of his autobi-
ography to explaining how those who planned the attack on the King David Hotel sought 
to minimize casualties. See id. at 212–30. He says that a member of the Irgun called the 
hotel, local newspapers, and the French Consulate to evacuate the building. Id. at 219. 
They allegedly used a 30-minute timer to allow evacuation to occur before detonation and 
marked the homemade bomb with signs. Id. 
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advance warning (or Begin’s later effort to scrub the historical record) 
suggests that political violence must be not only morally justified in 
some way, but also bounded in scope, if its perpetrators hope to be 
treated one day as liberators rather than common criminals. 
 The point of this discussion is not whether violence could be effec-
tive in turning the tide against slavery, but whether Brown and his 
compatriots believed that self-restraint could make a difference in how 
law-abiding Americans understood their actions. Framed this way, both 
the group’s resort to violence and the corresponding desire to tailor its 
use of force were calculated to ensure its message of constitutional 
change remained intelligible. The members hoped that their acts of 
slave-stealing would be perceived as legally justified moments of libera-
tion, pricking the collective conscience of the citizenry.83 Fellow Ameri-
cans could reject that vision, and many did, but the strategy was to 
promote, rather than destroy, the possibility of constitutional delibera-
tion. What Brown himself described as “a discriminating blow at Slav-
ery” would clarify the moral and legal stakes and escalate the pressure 
on citizens to choose sides.84
 It is striking that Brown did not turn his back on dialogue. Rather, 
over time, he became convinced that stronger action was needed to stir 
average Americans to do away with slavery. In a letter to his brother, 
Frederick, dated November 21, 1834, Brown conveyed his desire to “do 
something in a practical way for my poor fellow-men who are in bond-
age.”85 He mentioned his personal plan to raise and educate a slave “as 
we do our own.”86 In doing so, he planned to educate others on the 
importance of egalitarianism by modeling such virtues in his own life. 
 He then hinted at a more ambitious undertaking: 
Perhaps we might, under God, in that way do more towards 
breaking their yoke effectually than in any other. If the young 
blacks of our country could once become enlightened, it would 
most assuredly operate on slavery like firing powder confined 
in rock, and all slaveholders know it well. Witness their heaven-
daring laws against teaching blacks. If once the Christians in 
the free States would set to work in earnest in teaching the 
                                                                                                                      
83 See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 29, at 278–80. 
84 A document found among John Brown’s possessions, titled “Vindication of the Inva-
sion,” argued that it had been planned and conducted “in accordance with my settled 
policy.” Id. at 303 (internal quotation and emphasis omitted). 
85 Letter from John Brown to Frederick Brown (Nov. 21, 1834), in A John Brown 
Reader, supra note 15, at 42. 
86 Id. 
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blacks, the people of the slaveholding States would find them-
selves constitutionally driven to set about the work of emanci-
pation immediately.87
John Brown may have eschewed traditional politics, but through the 
exercise of charismatic leadership, he proved to be a shrewd manager 
of political sentiment. He was a master at writing letters to the editor, 
cultivating sympathetic news accounts, and spreading his religiously 
inflected constitutional vision in salons and open meetings alike.88 He 
curried support among prominent black intellectuals, less educated 
freedmen, and white abolitionists and artists.89 Brown had the person-
ality of a preacher, the mind of a military tactician, and the instincts of 
a trained advocate. 
 Far from being an undisciplined, final burst of aggression or the 
effectuation of a suicide plan, the plan to raid the armory and liberate 
slaves from the area appeared to be an extension of a broader dialogic 
effort. Some commentators have pointed out that few slaves could be 
found in the area as evidence of other motives or poor planning.90 In 
fact, a diffuse population in the area enhanced the prospects of guerilla 
warfare from a fortified community rather than a full-blown insurrec-
tion. Brown’s past efforts at targeted liberations and the conversion of 
slave-owning property involved relatively small, mobile groups that 
might have a chance of eluding pursuers.91 Thus, the Harpers Ferry 
plan would seem to be a logical, if bold, next step if Brown’s grander 
state-building ambitions were to be realized. 
 All of this ultimately leads to the question of whether Brown’s re-
sort to force in Harpers Ferry or elsewhere disqualifies him from par-
ticipating in the constitutional debate. There are two fruitful ways of 
approaching the matter. One is to ask: from within the constitutional 
                                                                                                                      
87 Id. at 43. 
88 See, e.g., John Brown, Advertisement, To the Friends of Freedom, N.Y. Trib., Mar. 4, 
1857, reprinted in A John Brown Reader, supra note 15, at 102 (petitioning for funds); 
John Brown, Letter to the Editor, Summit Beacon (Ohio), Dec. 20, 1855, reprinted in A 
John Brown Reader, supra note 15, at 88–93 (describing pro-slavery forces as “invaders” 
and stating that “[w]hat now remains for the Free State men of Kansas, and their friends in 
the State, and the world to do, is to hold the ground they now possess, and Kansas is free”) 
(emphasis omitted); John Brown, Old Brown’s Parallels, N.Y. Daily Trib., Jan. 22, 1859, 
reprinted in A John Brown Reader, supra note 15, at 114–15 (arguing that the excursion 
into the Osage settlement to free slaves “forcibly restored [them] to their ‘natural and 
inalienable rights,’ with but one man killed”). 
89 See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 29, at 97–98, 103–04. 
90 See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 14, at 95. 
91 See, e.g., infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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tradition, does John Brown’s resort to violence and law-breaking disen-
title him to speak as a citizen of a republic? Another possibility is to ask, 
from the standpoint of his audience, whether his resort to force would 
destroy, alter, or change the communicative efficacy of any state-building 
message? 
 Brown was not alone in believing that forceful resistance of unjust 
practices could be compatible with American constitutionalism. Lysan-
der Spooner, a Northern abolitionist who was deeply skeptical of organ-
ized religion, argued that slaves had a natural right to liberty, and that 
they therefore “have the right to take it by stratagem or force.”92 His 
self-defense theory extended to others who might come to the aid of a 
vulnerable member of the political community. Spooner rooted the 
right to use force on behalf of slaves in a “duty of the bystanders to go 
to his or her rescue, by force, if need, be [when] a human being is set 
upon by a robber, ravisher, murderer, or tyrant of any kind.”93 Spooner 
claimed, as Brown did: 
The state of Slavery is a state of war. In this case it is a just war, 
on the part of the negroes—a war for liberty, and the recom-
pense of injuries; and necessity justifies them in carrying it on 
by the only means their oppressors have left to them.94
Although Spooner cautioned against a “general insurrection, or any 
taking of life, until we of the North go down to take part in it,” he 
heartily advised “the flogging of individual Slave-holders” and “compel-
ling them . . . to execute deeds of emancipation, and conveyances of 
their property, to their slaves.”95
                                                                                                                      
92 Lysander Spooner, To the Non-Slaveholders of the South (1858), reprinted in 4 The Col-
lected Works of Lysander Spooner (Charles Shively, ed. 1971). See generally James J. 
Martin, Lysander Spooner, Dissident Among Dissidents, in Men Against the State: The Ex-
positors of Individualist Anarchism in America, 1827–1908, at 167, 180–201 (Ralph 
Myles Publisher, Inc. 1970) (1953) (describing Spooner’s political writings, including those 
regarding slavery, and his views on the U.S. Constitution); Randy E. Barnett, Was Slavery 
Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth Amendment?: Lysander Spooner’s Theory of Interpretation, 28 
Pac. L.J. 977 (1997) (explaining Spooner’s life and method of constitutional interpreta-
tion). 
93 Lysander Spooner, A Plan for the Abolition of Slavery (1858), reprinted in The Col-
lected Works of Lysander Spooner, supra note 92 (emphasis omitted). 
94 Spooner, supra note 92 (emphasis omitted). 
95 Id. 
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 Resistance of usurpations of government “is a strictly constitutional 
right,” Spooner argued.96 “And the exercise of the right is neither re-
bellion against the constitution, nor revolution—it is a maintenance of 
the constitution itself, by keeping the government within the constitu-
tion.”97 What is most interesting about his justification of force is that 
adherence to a constitution is married with an interpretation of the 
1787 U.S. Constitution as a pro-slavery document and the possibility of 
illegal or direct action, but nevertheless constitutional resistance, falling 
short of revolution or rebellion. Spooner’s endorsement of violence 
shocked moderate abolitionists and those who subscribed to a more 
orderly view of democratic change.98 Spooner and Brown shared a 
mentor and patron in Gerrit Smith, who helped finance the abolition-
ist cause.99 The two men met in Boston just before Harpers Ferry.100 
After Brown’s capture, Spooner came up with related plans of guerilla 
warfare against slavery, though none were executed.101 In the writings 
of Spooner and Brown one can detect efforts to theorize forms of con-
stitutional dissent beyond formal amendment or revolution: alternative 
reorganization, targeted lawbreaking, and moderated violence. 
 Within the democratic tradition, there are any number of indi-
viduals who advocated extra-legal means of political change, then suc-
cessfully traversed the categories from dissident to liberator, from law-
breaker to statesman. Think of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, 
Touissant L’Ouverture, Menachem Begin, and Yasser Arafat. When the 
people looked favorably upon their actions, they called them “freedom 
fighters” rather than common criminals. 
 Probing the relationship between violence and self-rule shows why. 
The act of repudiating a constitution or forcefully resisting its usurpa-
tion is as much a part of the American political tradition as writing, 
amending, or construing a constitution. Under Lockean principles of 
consent,102 sovereignty and self-defense are intimately connected and 
                                                                                                                      
96 Lysander Spooner, A Defense for Fugitive Slaves, Against the Acts of Congress of Feb. 12, 
1793, and Sept. 18, 1850, at 29 (1850), reprinted in The Collected Works of Lysander 
Spooner, supra note 92 (emphasis omitted). 
97 Id. 
98 See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 29, at 101. 
99 See Charles Shively, Biography, in 1 The Collected Works of Lysander Spooner 
15, 38 (Charles Shively ed., 1971). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 37–38. 
102 See generally Scott John Hammond, John Brown as Founder: America’s Violent Confronta-
tion with Its First Principles, in Terrible Swift Sword, supra note 3, at 61 (arguing that John 
Brown’s actions were compatible with the titles “founder” and “legislator”). 
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treated as inviolable rights. Recognizing the power to break a contract 
reaffirms a person’s autonomy to make one in the first place. Colonial-
ists took up arms against the King in the name of their God-given lib-
erty, clothing their violent act in natural law principles.103 We overlook 
their resort to force not only because they prevailed and wrote winners’ 
history, but also because they defended their behavior in moral and 
legal terms. That is to say, American revolutionaries’ targeted use of 
violence was subordinated to and constrained by their arguments 
rather than substituting for them. 
 Older religious traditions of revolutionary violence have served as 
inspiration. In the New Testament, the figure of Jesus angrily overturns 
the moneychangers’ tables in the Temple to signal his subversive de-
signs.104 Despite ushering in a new age founded on agape, he warns that 
the reconstitution of society is an inherently violent act: “I did not come 
to bring peace, but a sword. For I came to set a man against his father, 
and a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her 
mother-in-law; and a man’s enemies will be the members of his house-
hold.”105 Use of the family unit as a trope jars the people into remem-
bering that transforming a political order involves challenging one’s 
most basic allegiances. 
 Moving decisively to the fringes of society, and strategically leverag-
ing the prophetic tradition,106 the John Brown movement similarly 
sought both to dramatize the faulty aspects of the governing document 
(as construed by the U.S. Supreme Court to deny the humanity of 
slaves, once and forever)107 and to authorize a new constitution. By 
characterizing their project in the American idioms of renewal—which 
a surviving member of the movement described as “language every 
where understood by the haters of tyranny”108—Brown and his follow-
ers contested rather than repudiated established legal norms. In this 
sense, Brown portrayed himself as the constitutional tradition’s most 
righteous defender. 
                                                                                                                      
103 See The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776). 
104 See, e.g., Matthew 21:12–:14. 
105 Id. 10:34–:36. 
106 Brown was described as “another Moses,” and, after his execution, in increasingly 
Christ-like terms. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 2. 
107 John Brown’s “Declaration of Liberty” explicitly calls out the U.S. Supreme Court 
for its decision in 1856 of Dred Scott v. Sanford, which held, among other things, that former 
slaves could never become citizens, but were at best property as a matter of national consti-
tutional law. See 60 U.S. 393 (1856); Declaration of Liberty, supra note 71. 
108 Anderson, supra note 1, at 2. 
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 Consider another document found among Brown’s possessions 
upon his capture: “A Declaration of Liberty by the Representatives of 
the Slave Population of the United States of America.”109 In it, the un-
dersigned parroted the language of the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence and “assert[ed] their Natural Rights, as Human Beings, a 
Native and Mutual Citizens of a free Republic,” to “break that odious 
yoke of oppression, which is so unjustly laid upon them by their fellow 
countrymen.”110 The document, apparently drafted the summer before 
the attack on Harpers Ferry,111 recounts injustices wrought not by an 
external sovereign, but by pro-slavery lawmakers and jurists. It recapitu-
lated the maneuvers made famous by the Framers themselves: un-
apologetically criticizing corrupt officials (thus treating them as tempo-
rary stewards who have lost their way) while exhibiting fervent loyalty to 
more enduring ideals (and therefore reaffirming allegiance to the rule 
of law, broadly understood). As this exercise confirms, the astute radi-
cal will take up his political forebears’ instruments. 
 Both of these exercises of self-government through writing—the 
Provisional Constitution and the Declaration of Liberty—occurred af-
ter John Brown’s participation in the fight over slavery in Kansas, a 
bloody affair that tested the anti-slavery coalition.112 The timing of 
these events suggests that the documents may have been aimed in part 
at this audience: sympathizers who suddenly feared a backlash and ob-
servers who might yet join the anti-slavery cause, but wondered about 
the ultimate ends of extra-legal agitation. A Free Kansas, already emerg-
ing as a symbol of success in the abolitionist cause, likely inspired the 
movement to codify certain principles of governance with an eye to-
ward making them public. 
 By the time Brown led a band of volunteers to defend a free-state 
settlement, conditions had so degenerated that pro-slavery forces 
sacked the city of Lawrence.113 Yet the brutal slaying of unarmed pro-
slavery settlers at Pottawatomie in May of 1856 by Brown’s men stunned 
opponents and supporters alike.114 It appeared to be a calculated act of 
reprisal for the attack on Lawrence. Although he was not one to voice 
regret, the writing of political liberation documents in the months fol-
                                                                                                                      
109 E.g., Reynolds, supra note 29, at 300. 
110 Declaration of Liberty, supra note 71. 
111 Reynolds, supra note 29, at 300. 
112 See Chowder, supra note 14, at 84 (describing the Pottawatomie Massacre in 1856 
that “ignited all-out war in Kansas”). 
113 See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 29, at 156–57. 
114 E.g., id. at 174–75. 
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lowing the bloody days of Kansas might be seen as an effort to back 
away from the brink of unrestrained violence, to place the extreme 
events of Kansas in context, and, if possible, to reconfirm the goals of 
constitutionalism. There is no decisive evidence either way, but the tim-
ing is suggestive. If this is correct, we ought to see the John Brown 
movement’s resort to text as an attempt to erase the horrific memory of 
bloodshed, and, after the chaos of Kansas, as a return to the rule of law. 
 If there has always been a primal relationship between self-rule 
and force, the latter risks drowning out the former and sapping it of 
legitimacy and effectiveness. It is a lesson learned from the French 
Revolution’s descent into popular violence, which consumed any sem-
blance of the rule of law, and has even impacted the reading of the U.S. 
Constitution in modern times.115 From within liberal theory itself, a 
targeted use of force may be compatible with notions of self-defense. 
Certainly radical abolitionists argued as much in extending protection 
of the self to the protection of fellow human beings threatened with 
force. John Brown’s program to “free the slaves” but not necessarily to 
provoke a “revolt” was entirely compatible with this ideology. On the 
other hand, a turn toward total or unrestrained aggression would ar-
guably deprive the actor of his claim to speak as a citizen—to make 
one’s actions not only unintelligible but also illegitimate. Would Ameri-
cans accept a creative, temporary redrawing of these lines upon which 
the radical project depends? The question, at its core, involved whether 
a political actor has rejected the possibility of the rule of law. 
 We might understand the tactics of the fringe constitutionalism to 
consist of: (1) manipulating political traditions in the name of struc-
tural change; (2) acting in good faith to realize certain governing ide-
als; and (3) adhering to a principle of moderation with regard to tac-
tics. Within this model, an advocate turns to calibrated illegality to 
precipitate a break in historical time while signaling a desire to remain 
                                                                                                                      
115 As just one example, Justice Hugo Black compared his brethren’s decision in Brown 
v. Louisiana, protecting African-American demonstrators in the streets, to France’s descent 
into revolutionary chaos: 
Governments like ours were formed to substitute the rule of law for the rule 
of force . . . . The peaceful songs of love can become as stirring and provoca-
tive as the Marseillaise did in the days when a noble revolution gave way to 
rule by successive mobs until chaos set in. The holding in this case today 
makes it more necessary than ever that we stop and look more closely at 
where we are going. 
383 U.S. 131, 168 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). Presumably, Justice Black made such a 
provocative statement believing that it would stoke the fears of educated Americans, 
though surely some would find the comparison strained. 
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a participant to the broader societal discussion underway. Resorting to 
constitution writing and deliberative gatherings together conveyed 
Brown’s intentions as a would-be founder. 
 What is the relationship between constitutionalism, terrorism, and 
citizenship? Constitutionalism is a practice in which individuals come 
together and agree to be governed for mutual benefit, usually through 
the formation of institutions whose powers are limited by certain prin-
ciples. In the United States, such self-governing principles appear gen-
erally, but not exclusively, in writing. The citizen is a subject of such a 
political arrangement, who has voluntarily or tacitly consented to be 
bound by a community’s principles for self-governance. Terrorism is 
best defined as the pursuit of symbolic violence by an individual or 
group to effect a change in governmental policy.116 As a political strat-
egy, terrorism is usually associated with the lack of resources and formal 
political power.117
 These categories overlap but are not conterminous (Fig. A). The 
fringe constitutionalist may also be a terrorist, but need not be. It is 
possible to pursue unlawful, but nonviolent strategies in resisting gov-
erning ideals, and hence avoid the terrorist appellation. Moreover, 
unlike some extremists (for example, anarchists committed to no par-
ticular reconstructive project or theocrats bent on the overthrow of lib-
eral democracy), the fringe constitutionalist remains a creature of the 
American political tradition. For all of his willingness to test society’s 
                                                                                                                      
116 Most political scientists and policy analysts agree that terrorism entails the use of 
extra-legal or extra-normal violence in pursuit of political objectives. See, e.g., Enders & 
Sandler, supra note 82, at 3; Brian M. Jenkins, Statements About Terrorism, 463 Annals Am. 
Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci., Sept. 1982, at 11, 12–13; David C. Rapoport, Messianic Sanctions for 
Terror, 20 Comp. Pol. 195, 196–97 (1988); Achin Vanaik, Terrorism: Definition and Ethics, 
Econ. & Pol. Wkly., Oct. 5, 2002, at 4164, 4166. Federal anti-terrorism statues incorporate 
some of these insights, particularly the use of violent or illegal actions taken for a political 
motive, though some limit the scope of regulated activity to attacks on innocents or non-
combatants. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2006) (defining international terrorism as any violent 
or life-threatening unlawful act undertaken with specified (generally political) motives; 
identities of actor and victim irrelevant); 22 U.S.C. § 2656f (d)(2)(2006) (defining terror-
ism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2006) (defin-
ing international terrorism as including “violent acts or acts dangerous to human life” that 
are intended “to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion”). Not 
all definitions of terrorism limit the category to non-state actors. See Walter Laquer, Reflec-
tions on Terrorism, 65 Foreign Aff. 86, 88 (1986) (stating “that terrorism is the use or threat 
of violence, a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals, that its aim is to 
induce a state of fear in the victim, that it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitar-
ian norms, and that publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy”). 
117 See, e.g., Enders & Sandler, supra note 82, at 116–17. 
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tolerance for violence and disorder, he is committed to the possibility 
of self-governance according to a written constitution. 
 A terrorist could be characterized a fringe constitutionalist depend-
ing on the scope of his objectives, the degree with which his vision of 
social change includes lasting institutional transformation as opposed to 
purely individual or moral reformation, and whether he abides by the 
principle of moderation. The terrorist usually turns to violence in order 
to precipitate a change in public policy or cultural values.118
 Someone who employs extra-legal means merely for transient 
changes in public policy, as opposed to structural or ethical changes, 
would likewise be excluded from the category of radical constitutional-
ism. It is possible to be a terrorist but not a constitutionalist, a person 
with no intention of creating a new legal-political order based, or abid-
ing by, the maxims of written constitutionalism. For instance, Ted Kac-
zynski’s techno-authoritarian critique of American society led him to an 
anarchic solution in which the free market would promote liberty in 
the absence of the state.119 In spite of resorting to writing, terrorists 
such as Kaczynski could lay no plausible claim to the tradition of popu-
lar revision of constitutional commitments. 
 Then there is the category of citizen, who is constituted by respect 
for the rule of law. An ordinary citizen who breaks the law is called a 
common criminal. One can be a citizen without being an activist or 
constitutionalist, just as a citizen can avoid the terrorist label by fore-
swearing non-traditional, illegal, or violent politics. At some point, an 
individual may, in fact, lose the prerogative to be heard as a citizen. The 
more that an individual veers toward indiscriminate or total violence, 
the more likely others will perceive an intention to disaffiliate com-
pletely from the political community. At some point, violence no longer 
teaches, but renders observers mute or painstricken, utterly unable to 
reason. In that moment, the possibility of democratic constitutionalism 
vanishes. 
                                                                                                                      
118 See, e.g., id. at 4. 
119 See, e.g., Michael Mello, The United States of America Versus Theodore John 
Kaczynski: Ethics, Power and the Invention of the Unabomber 150–53 (1999) 
(summarizing Kaczynski’s ideology as set forth in his manifesto); see also Unabomber’s 
Manifesto, http://cyber.eserver.org/unabom.txt (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (text of the 
full manifesto). Kaczynski pled guilty to being the Unabomber, charged with killing and 
injuring people during an 18-year period and is serving a life sentence. William Glaberson, 
The Unabomber Case: The Overview; Ted Kaczynski Avoids a Death Sentence with Guilty Plea, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 23, 1998, at A1. 
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Figure A 
 John Brown occupied that strange place where the three catego-
ries overlap (Figure A). Navigating the distinctions between the catego-
ries proved to be an important element of his project. He did, in fact, 
employ force against state actors as well as non-state actors.120 Unlike 
slave revolt leaders of the past, however, he found value in articulating 
the next constitutional order. He believed in the rule of law and was 
interested in building institutions. 
 Osborne P. Anderson, the only surviving member of the party that 
raided Harpers Ferry, explained: 
Hark and another met Nat Turner in secret places, after the 
fatigues of a toilsome day were ended; Gabriel promulg[ated] 
his treason in the silence of the dense forest; but John Brown 
reasoned of liberty and equality in broad daylight, in a mod-
ernized building, in conventions with closed doors, in meet-
ings governed by the elaborate regulations laid down by Jef-
ferson, and used as their guides by Congresses and 
Legislatures . . . .121
                                                                                                                      
120 See Anderson, supra note 1, at 28–29. 
121 Id. at 8. Anderson went on to claim that “[i]nsurrection has its progressive side, and 
has been elevated by John Brown from the skulking, fearing cabal, when in the hands of a 
brave but despairing few, to the highly organized, formidable, and to very many, indispen-
sable institution for the security of freedom, when guided by intelligence.” Id. Twin moti-
vations appear to animate his labors: distinguishing his group from the mob and appealing 
to the dialogic function fulfilled by its members’ virtuous actions. 
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 Brown turned to violence when ordinary politics and less forceful 
methods, such as the Underground Railroad and slave stealing,122 did 
little to change the basic political, legal, and economic structure that 
enabled the persistence of slavery. He came to realize that isolated acts 
of resistance siphoned away and dissipated energy for concerted action. 
Yet for all one can tell, he never gave up his right to seek redress for the 
wrongs committed against other human beings in the name of slavery. 
Brown revealed himself to be a domestic terrorist, a citizen, and—as 
the legal wrangling at trial confirmed—a dedicated constitutionalist. 
III. The Dialectical Nature of Public Debate 
 What, then, can be said about the relationship between traditional 
constitutionalism and its outlier? Practitioners of each brand of politics 
share a commitment to governance according to the rule of law and 
the legitimacy and reformative power of communal judgments. They 
vigorously disagree about the degree to which existing institutions can 
be reformed, which procedures and tactics are appropriate, and the 
timing and nature of any popular interventions. The mainstream actor 
fears that backlash will reverse any progress already made, whereas the 
radical believes polarization is the only means through which a matter 
may be resolved once and for all. 
 More specifically, the relationship between fringe constitutionalism 
and mainstream constitutionalism is irreducibly dialectical. This is true 
not only of what participants say, but also what they do. We should not 
miss this symbiotic relationship even though practitioners of traditional 
modes of discourse must create space for compromise and political 
resolution in part by denouncing the radical’s tactics. Likewise, even 
though it is convenient, and even necessary, for the extremist to casti-
gate mainstream tactics as ineffective and unprincipled, in actuality, 
fringe legal culture depends on mainstream denunciations for the 
radical critique to be sustained. And although the radical’s ultimate 
vision of political community might not be achieved, he or she may 
succeed in advancing the timetable for political debate, decisively re-
framing the human and legal stakes, or empowering mainstream con-
stitutional actors. As one terrorism expert points out, extreme “meth-
                                                                                                                      
122 On December 20, 1858, Brown took twenty men into Vernon County, Missouri, and 
forcibly liberated eleven slaves from two farms. E.g., Reynolds, supra note 29, at 278–79. 
Eighty-two days and 1000 miles later, these individuals found freedom in Canada. Id. at 
287. 
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ods always provoke outrage, but the paradox is that they can arouse 
moral support too.”123
 Take Lysander Spooner’s view of the Free Soil Party, whose plat-
form opposed the extension of slavery into new territories. He called 
“[i]ts ideas . . . fogyish, and tame, and cowardly,” and groused that the 
party’s leadership was made up of “a few old stereotypes, or rather fos-
silized Whigs.”124 In turn, Spooner found himself attacked by main-
stream actors for licensing anarchy, as well as by Garrisonians who 
found his reading of the U.S. Constitution as an anti-slavery document 
a sign of dangerous accommodation.125
 Similar themes can be traced in the dealings between two practi-
tioners of democratic constitutionalism on the question of what to do 
about slavery: John Brown and Frederick Douglass. Although Doug-
lass’s views on slavery might not have aligned with the preferences of 
the median voter or elected official in the mid-nineteenth century, his 
general commitment to dominant legal and political processes and his 
refusal to turn to violence merit treating him as a traditional constitu-
tionalist.126 There is little question that Douglass became increasingly 
resigned to the prospect that there would be bloodshed before the 
slavery question could be settled with any measure of finality.127 Even 
so, after his split from the Garrisonian wing of the abolitionist move-
ment—which stressed disobedience, abstention from voting, and edu-
cation of slaveowners about the wrongfulness of slavery128—he called 
for increased engagement through electoral politics and the Article V 
process for amending the U.S. Constitution.129
 In a letter dated January 9, 1854, Brown wrote to Douglass, ex-
pounding: 
[T]he extreme wickedness of persons who use their influence 
to bring law and order and good government, and courts of 
                                                                                                                      
123 The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications, at xvi (Da-
vid C. Rapoport & Yonah Alexander eds., 2d ed. 1989) (emphasis omitted). 
124 Shively, supra note 99, at 39 (quoting a letter from Lysander Spooner to George 
Bradburn (Apr. 19, 1854)). 
125 Id. 
126 See William S. McFeely, Frederick Douglass 189 (1991). 
127 See Reynolds, supra note 29, at 254. 
128 Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process 151 
(1975). For a discussion of “radical constitutional antislavery,” see id. at 149–58 (discussing 
of the approach of Garrisonians); William M. Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery 
Constitutionalism in America, 1760–1848, at 249–75 (1977). 
129 See McFeely, supra note 126, at 253. Douglass later advised President Lincoln and 
advocated for the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments. See, e.g., id. at 233–34, 256. 
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justice into disrespect and contempt of mankind, and to do 
what in their power lies to destroy confidence in legislative 
bodies, and to bring magistrates, justices, and other officers of 
the law into disrespect amongst men.130
The letter evinced a concern for the erosion of the rule of law by public 
officials who endorse and thereby entrench slavery, despite what Brown 
believed to be a consensus among the Framers of the Constitution to 
disfavor the practice.131 His critique tracked the corruption motif of the 
Declaration of Independence, which would later reappear in his 
group’s liberation documents.132
 Brown closed the letter not by seeking to end debate over slavery, 
but by affirming that his words and actions, although insufficient, may 
nevertheless enable mainstream advocates to take action: 
I am too destitute of words to express the tithe of what I feel, 
and utterly incapable of doing the subject any possible degree 
of justice, in my own estimation. My only encouragement to 
begin, was the earnest wish that if I might express, so that it 
may be understood to all, an important fact, that you or some 
friend of God and the right, will take it up and clothe it in the 
suitable language to be noticed and felt. I want to have the 
enquiry everywhere raised—Who are the men that are un-
dermining our truly republican and democratic institutions at 
their very foundations? I forgot to head my remarks “Law and 
Order.”133
 In the letter, Brown reveals a sophisticated understanding of his 
role in historical events. He knows his own words and actions may be 
“incapable” of reaching everyone. And he prays that others with stand-
ing in the community will “take it up and clothe it the suitable language 
to be noticed and felt.”134
 The Provisional Constitution embodied a maturation of John 
Brown’s thinking, and the final stage of his own evolution from itiner-
ant farmer to guerilla fighter to would-be nation-builder. Consider an 
exchange between the abolitionist Frederick Douglass and John Brown 
                                                                                                                      
130 Letter from John Brown to Frederick Douglass ( Jan. 9, 1854), in A John Brown 
Reader, supra note 15, at 84. 
131 See id. at 84–85. 
132 See, e.g., Provisional Const. pmbl.; Declaration of Liberty, supra note 71. 
133 Letter from John Brown to Frederick Douglass, supra note 130. 
134 Id. 
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that reportedly took place in 1847, as reported by W.E.B. DuBois. Ac-
cording to Douglass: 
[Brown’s] plan as it then lay in his mind had much to com-
mend it. It did not, as some suppose, contemplate a general 
rising among the slaves, and a general slaughter of the slave-
masters. An insurrection, he thought, would only defeat the 
object; but his plan did contemplate the creating of an armed 
force which should act in the very heart of the South. He was 
not averse to the shedding of blood, and thought the practice 
of carrying arms would be a good one for the colored people 
to adopt, as it would give them a sense of their manhood. No 
people, he said, could have self-respect, or be respected, who 
would not fight for their freedom.135
If DuBois’s second-hand account is accurate, then Brown dreamed of 
an armed, constitutionally self-regulating society. It is doubtful that he 
would have objected to a general slave revolt, but this may have been a 
welcome byproduct rather than his central goal. Brown apparently con-
tinued: 
The true object to be sought is first of all to destroy the money 
value of slavery property; and that can only be done by render-
ing such property insecure. My plan, then, is to take at first 
about twenty-five picked men, and begin on a small scale; sup-
ply them with arms and ammunition and post them in squads 
of fives on a line of twenty-five miles. The most persuasive and 
judicious of these shall go down to the fields from time to 
time, as opportunity offers, and induce the slaves to join them, 
seeking and selecting the most restless and daring.136
The project to destabilize slavery as an industry (in the words of 
Spooner, to “[m]ake Slavery unprofitable” and “make Slaveholders ob-
jects of derision and contempt”137) would take months, if not years. 
The existence of an alternative community not far from Southern bor-
ders, possibly on the move, would help to heighten slave owners’ sense 
of “insecurity” in their human property. Not only could slaves be liber-
ated at any time, but slaves might be motivated to run off and join this 
egalitarian community. 
                                                                                                                      
135 Du Bois, supra note 2, at 58 (internal quotation omitted). 
136 Id. at 59 (internal quotation omitted). 
137 Spooner, supra note 92 (emphasis omitted). 
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 Starting with committed anti-slavery activists and branching out to 
include slaves interested in reclaiming their liberty, the group would 
grow itself gradually, then make off into the nearby mountains and 
hold their ground “despite of all efforts of Virginia to dislodge 
them.”138 This conversation revealed a desire not to instigate a general 
slave revolt, to sack the state government of Virginia, or to levy war 
against the U.S. government, but rather to destabilize the slave trade on 
a county-by-county basis and reconstitute a nation elsewhere. Incursions 
into slave-owning territory would take place “from time to time.”139 It is 
a plan that Brown’s eventual captors could not fathom, a goal that is 
confirmed in Article XLVI of the Provisional Constitution.140
 How, then, does Harpers Ferry figure in a plan to re-establish con-
stitutional self-rule in egalitarian terms? Brown could easily have hid-
den in the hills and created a utopian society without launching this 
particular assault. It is a puzzle, one that has led many observers to 
throw up their hands and declare Brown and his followers naïve or de-
lusional.141 Why attack federal property if one did not have designs to 
levy war against the federal government? Why not just expand the slave 
stealing enterprise without such a grand statement? 
 There surely must be complicated strategic reasons for the assault. 
Many explanations fail to appreciate the logic of terrorism, which is, 
above all, about manipulating political perceptions in the face of over-
whelming resources. No doubt Brown sought a galvanizing statement 
that would ensure that the slavery question would continue to be a pri-
ority. The armory’s location in Virginia, a committed slave state, made 
it an attractive site for showing that anti-slavery radicals were not afraid 
to take the fight into the heart of the South, and would not be satisfied 
with incremental gains on neutral terrain.142
 An attack on Harpers Ferry fulfilled an added communicative 
function. Even if the group did not wish to levy war against the United 
States (and there is no evidence of such a plan),143 they believed the 
federal government to be morally implicated in the entrenchment of 
                                                                                                                      
138 Du Bois, supra note 2, at 59 (internal quotation omitted). 
139 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
140 Provisional Const. art. XLVI. 
141 See Reynolds, supra note 29, at 339–40 (recounting the reactions to Harpers Ferry 
in Northern papers describing Brown as a madman). 
142 See id. at 296. 
143 Even though Brown attacked federal property and federal troops came to apprehend 
Brown, the federal government allowed the Commonwealth to try him on state charges, 
arguably in part to aid the narrative that would be produced that Brown was a common 
criminal and the state was more than capable of restoring public order. See id. at 337. 
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slavery. Attacking federal property sent a message that the national 
government—and Americans collectively—could no longer sit on the 
sidelines, crafting temporary compromises. The point here is not to 
romanticize the group, but to understand how its members saw them-
selves as constitutional actors. If the taxpayers’ resources were being 
utilized on behalf of pro-slavery forces, then why not secure some of 
these resources for anti-slavery advocates? Finally, the group was also 
likely short on munitions, and it might have been easier to arm nearby 
slaves and carry remaining munitions into the hills rather than trans-
port necessary weaponry such a long distance. Each man “had forty 
rounds apiece when [they] went to the Ferry,”144 and two men were 
sent to secure a local rifle factory. These goals seemed to coalesce into 
an audacious plan, given coherence by dreams of a new experiment in 
self-rule. 
 Osborne P. Anderson makes a revealing admission in his recount-
ing of the events at Harpers Ferry: “It was no part of the original plan 
to hold on to the Ferry, or to parley with prisoners; but by so doing, 
time was afforded to carry the news of its capture to several points, and 
forces were thrown into the place, which surrounded us.”145 Brown or-
dered three men to stay behind at the Kennedy Farm as sentinels, un-
der instructions to guard arms and supplies, and to move them to a 
nearby schoolhouse when rejoined by men from the assault com-
pany.146 Thus, the raid was never intended as an end-game, but rather 
as a major next step in securing a shared constitutional vision. Holding 
the town temporarily was consistent with the group’s plan to make a 
symbolic statement with the raid, replenish supplies, and free nearby 
slaves. Survivors of the raid were to meet up with their comrades and 
liberated slaves before moving on. Tactical mistakes during its execu-
tion, however, made escape and further construction of the political 
community impossible. 
                                                                                                                      
144 Anderson, supra note 1, at 48. 
145 Id. at 38. Anderson’s account of the events is deeply influenced by his personal 
stake in John Brown’s legacy. Nevertheless, on this point, that the actions of the group 
departed from original planning seems reliable, given that it does not necessarily portray 
the group in a positive light. 
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182 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:151 
 With a free state flourishing in the mountains,147 perhaps others 
tainted by participation in a thoroughly corrupt system would see rea-
son to join the new community and thereby become educated in a new 
life bathed in radical egalitarianism. Organized according to the rule of 
law and a familiar political iconography, a nation within a nation could 
serve as an inspiration to others. Brown’s repeated disavowal of trea-
sonous motivations, coupled with his turn toward constitutional meth-
ods, suggest a general strategy to claim his natural born citizen’s right 
to contest the meaning of the original Constitution—even to break it— 
so others might see that the time had come for renewal. 
 They likely hoped to recreate life at the Kennedy Farm, located “in 
a mountainous region” in Maryland about four miles from Harpers 
Ferry.148 There, the group lived out many of the precepts of the Provi-
sional Constitution, beginning each day with prayer and “cooking, wash-
ing, and other domestic work[,] . . . no one being exempt, because of 
age or official grade in the organization.”149 It was there that much of 
the preparations took place for the raid. On Sunday morning, October 
16, Brown led a solemn reading of the Provisional Constitution and 
oaths were sworn before leaving the Farm and setting off for Virginia.150
 Interdicted before it had any chance of success, the plan to estab-
lish a utopian society and engage in guerilla warfare seemed ill-
conceived.151 Still, is it possible that democratic faith in its purest form 
                                                                                                                      
 
147 Wisely or not, the mountains surrounding Harpers Ferry figure prominently in the 
group’s plans. Anderson’s account of his own harrowing escape confirms these suspicions 
about a tactical advantage the group would gain from the topography. See Anderson, supra 
note 1, at 48. Anderson recounts the ordeal: 
A few minutes before dark, the troops came in search of us. They came to the 
foot of the mountains, marched and counter-marched, but never attempted 
to search the mountains; we supposed from their movements that they feared 
a host of armed enemies in concealment . . . . Being further in the moun-
tains, and more secure, we could see without personal harm befalling us . . . . 
I was loth [sic] to leave him, as we both knew that danger was more imminent 
than when in the mountains around Harpers Ferry. At the latter place, the 
ignorant slaveholding aristocracy were unacquainted with the topography of 
their own grand hills . . . . 
Id. at 48, 52, 53. 
148 Id. at 20; see also Reynolds, supra note 29, at 297–98. 
149 Anderson, supra note 1, at 24–25. 
150 Reynolds, supra note 29, at 307. 
151 Robert Jewett, for example, finds the raid “a farcical affair, so poorly planned and 
executed that the anticipated slave uprising could not possibly have occurred.” Robert 
Jewett, The Captain America Complex: The Dilemma of Zealous Nationalism 85 
(1973). He points to the event, characterized by “Brown’s disdain for rational planning,” as 
one of the “definitive expressions of hot zeal in the American experience.” Id. Even so, 
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has been mistaken for divinely-inspired lunacy? For the strategy of 
modeling through self-constitution, as the parable of the mustard seed 
teaches, depends on equal measures hard work and blind hope.152 We 
shall never know how long a nascent free democratic society might 
have survived if Brown and his men had escaped, nurtured by northern 
resources and the occasional infusion of newly freed slaves. We will 
never get to see whether through more traditional forms of persuasion, 
such as pamphlets and impromptu conventions, the community might 
have won new converts from among those who wished to disaffiliate 
from the existing political regime. 
 Brown and his followers could imagine a temporal community—
indeed, they believed they were living out its principles already and 
bringing the community to fruition in their relationships with one an-
other and the rest of society. Correctly or not, they felt that this consti-
tutional transformation could take place without bringing the group 
into direct legal conflict with the existing U.S. Constitution. 
 John Brown’s trial at Charlestown proved to be the ultimate test of 
his brand of fringe constitutionalism. As Robert Ferguson puts it, the 
man’s “performance was part of his cultural transformation.”153 De-
prived of an insanity defense after initially proposing it, Brown’s lawyers 
did their best to respect his grand plan to be treated as a patriot.154 
They did so by seizing on legal technicalities (such as the elements of 
each crime, as well as the fact that Brown was not a citizen of Virginia) 
to make broader political arguments.155 His attorneys argued: “There is 
a manifest distinction” between seeking to free slaves and citing them 
                                                                                                                      
Jewett finds that the “remarkable thing about hot zeal has been its power to inspire estab-
lishment and antiestablishment figures alike, to give shape to behavior patterns on both 
the right and the left in American politics.” Id. at 87. 
152 See Matthew 13:31–:32 (“The kingdom of heaven is like a mustard seed that some-
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the greatest of shrubs and becomes a tree, so that the birds of the air come and make nests 
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153 Robert A. Ferguson, The Trial in American Life 137 (2007). 
154 See Steven Lubet, Nothing But the Truth: Why Trial Lawyers Don’t, Can’t, 
and Shouldn’t Have to Tell the Whole Truth 65, 79–80 (2001). Steven Lubet re-
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tution vision, which he did his best to preserve by rejecting the insanity defense and per-
mitting his lawyers to limit the apparent scope of conflict between his provisional govern-
ment and Virginia law. 
155 E.g., id. at 79. 
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“to rebellion and insurrection.”156 People died during the Harpers 
Ferry raid, it was admitted, but in the larger scheme of things such re-
grettable deaths should not be treated as “murder” within the terms of 
Virginia law.157 Mens rea was manipulated less to afford him a real 
chance of acquittal than to portray his motives in a virtuous light and 
preserve his capacity to speak against slavery as a virtuous citizen. 
 The prosecution evidently treated this gambit seriously, and the 
defendant’s effort to capitalize on the trial for the antislavery cause was 
met squarely. With rights came duties, lead prosecutor Andrew Hunter 
pointed out: 
Let the word treason mean breach of trust, and did he not be-
tray that trust with which, as a citizen, he is invested when 
within our borders? By the Federal Constitution, he was a citi-
zen when he was here, and did that bond of Union—which 
may ultimately prove a bad bond to us in the South—allow 
him to come into the bosom of the Commonwealth, with the 
deadly purpose of applying the torch to our buildings and 
shedding the blood of our citizens.158
 The state’s efforts to discredit Brown’s republican project contin-
ued. His professed self-restraint, a central theme of his lawyers’ ques-
tioning of the witnesses, was mocked by the prosecution: “[T]he idea 
that Brown shed blood only in self-defense was too absurd to require 
argument.”159 Yet the Commonwealth’s agents felt compelled to 
counter the idea. Stripping Brown of his claim to civic virtue, the 
Commonwealth insisted that his agenda was no different than any 
other criminal plan to steal, maim, kill, or otherwise act with malice 
aforethought against another human being: 
The 46th section [of the Provisional Constitution] has been re-
ferred to, as showing it was not treasonable, but . . . [t]he 
whole document must be taken together. The property of 
slaveholders was to be confiscated all over the South, and any 
man found in arms was to be shot down . . . . When you put 
pikes in the hands of the slaves, and have their masters captive, 
that is advice to slaves to rebel, and punishable with death.160
                                                                                                                      
156 The Life, Trial and Execution of Captain John Brown, supra note 4, at 87. 
157 See id. at 88–89. 
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 Through legal arguments and the execution of a death sentence, 
the government attacked the brand of constitutionalism Brown pur-
sued as much as the substantive principles for which he labored. 
Brown’s speech at his sentencing recapitulated his general message. He 
invoked his own earlier, celebrated act of slave stealing as a way of try-
ing to recover his credibility: 
I deny everything but what I have all along admitted, of a de-
sign on my part to free the slaves. I intended certainly to have 
made a clean thing of that matter, as I did last winter when I 
went into Missouri, and there took slaves without the snap-
ping of a gun on either side, moving them through the coun-
try, and finally leaving them in Canada. I designed to have 
done the same thing again on a larger scale.161
In the end, the would-be statesman sought to transcend the proceed-
ings that confined and therefore distorted his goals: 
I feel entirely satisfied with the treatment I have received on 
my trial. Considering all the circumstances, it has been more 
generous than I expected. But I feel no consciousness of guilt. 
I have stated from the first what was my intention, and what 
was not. I never had any design against the liberty of any per-
son, nor any disposition to commit treason or excite slaves to 
rebel or make any general insurrection.162
 The man’s concluding words emphasized that popular sovereignty 
underwrote the project: “Not one but joined me of his own accord, and 
the greater part at their own expense. A number of them I never saw, 
and never had a word of conversation with till the day they came to me, 
and that was for the purpose I have stated.”163 The faceless people of 
untold numbers, willing to make sacrifices in the name of democratic 
justice, had freely come together for an enlightened cause. Brown’s 
final message: they would rise again. 
 Months before, the final interactions between John Brown and 
Frederick Douglass presaged the tensions in the American political tra-
dition made public during trial. The Provisional Constitution found on 
Brown’s body had been drafted in the home of Douglass, designing 
what William McFeely calls an “Appalachian state.”164 It appears that 
                                                                                                                      
161 Id. at 94. 
162 The Life, Trial and Execution of Captain John Brown, supra note 4, at 95. 
163 Id. 
164 McFeely, supra note 126, at 190, 192. 
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Brown had traveled to Douglass’s home with the goal in mind of writ-
ing at that location, hoping for the black leader’s input and to per-
suade him to join the cause as a founding father.165 The historical re-
cord is not clear whether Douglass seriously entertained the idea, but 
he was later heard to brag that he possessed a copy of the instrument in 
Brown’s hand.166
 When Douglass urged once again that they might yet “convert the 
slaveholders” through peaceful methods alone, Brown became ani-
mated, convinced that masters had to be “induced” to give up their way 
of life.167 Brown had come to believe that the rhetoric of national lead-
ers had become beautiful but useless, and that only concerted local ac-
tion could cause a material change in the status of the oppressed. But 
his receptivity to more extreme forms of action did not mean giving up 
on the possibility of political fellowship or self-rule according to a writ-
ten instrument. Rather, his rejection of accommodation meant the con-
tinuation of constitutional discourse through other, riskier means. 
Though in the end Douglass decided not to join Brown’s plan or con-
done it after his execution, the abolitionist came away moved by the 
words of the fringe constitutionalist. Douglass found John Brown’s 
“zeal,” his “display of rigid virtue,” to be as “real as iron or granite.”168 
He emerged from these interactions “less hopeful of [slavery’s] peace-
ful abolition.”169 And yet, despite the fact Douglass kept to conven-
tional modes of persuasion as Brown struck his symbolic blow for free-
dom, Douglass found his own writings and speeches “more and more 
tinged by the color of this man’s strong impressions.”170
                                                                                                                      
165 Id. at 192. 
166 Id. 
167 Du Bois, supra note 2, at 60 (internal quotation omitted). 
168 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
169 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
170 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
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Appendix A 
PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION AND ORDINANCES FOR THE 
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
PREAMBLE. 
Whereas, slavery throughout its entire existence in the United States, is 
none other than a most barbarous, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war 
of one portion of its citizens upon another portion, the only conditions 
of which are perpetual imprisonment and hopeless servitude or 
absolute extermination; in utter disregard and violation of those 
eternal and self-evident truths set forth in our Declaration of 
Independence: Therefore 
We, citizens of the United States, and the Oppressed People, who, by a 
recent decision of the Supreme Court are declared to have no rights 
which the White Man is bound to respect; together with all other 
people degraded by the laws thereof, Do, for the time being ordain and 
establish ourselves, the following Provisional Constitution and 
Ordinances, the better to protect our Persons, Property, Lives, and 
Liberties; and to govern our actions: 
ARTICLE I 
Qualifications for membership. 
All persons of mature age, whether Proscribed, oppressed, and 
enslaved Citizens, or of the Proscribed and oppressed races of the 
United States, who shall agree to sustain and enforce the Provisional 
Constitution and Ordinance of this organization, together with all 
minor children of such persons, shall be held to be fully entitled to 
protection under the same. 
ARTICLE II. 
Branches of government. 
The provisional government of this organization shall consist of three 
branches, viz.: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. 
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ARTICLE III. 
Legislative. 
The legislative branch shall be a Congress or House of Representatives, 
composed of not less than five, nor more than ten members, who shall 
be elected by all citizens of mature age and of sound mind, connected 
with this organization; and who shall remain in office for three years, 
unless sooner removed for misconduct, inability, or by death. A 
majority of such members shall constitute a quorum. 
ARTICLE IV. 
Executive. 
The executive branch of this organization shall consist of a President 
and Vice-President, who shall be chosen by the citizens or members of 
this organization, and each of whom shall hold his office for three 
years, unless sooner removed by death, or for inability or misconduct. 
ARTICLE V. 
Judicial. 
The judicial branch of this organization shall consist of one Chief-
Justice of the Supreme Court, and of four Associate Judges of said 
Court; each constituting a Circuit Court. They shall each be chosen in 
the same manner as the President, and shall continue in office until 
their places have been filled in the same manner by election of the 
citizens. Said court shall have jurisdiction in all civil or criminal causes, 
arising under this constitution, except breaches of the Rules of War. 
ARTICLE VI. 
Validity of enactments. 
All enactments of the legislative branch shall, to become valid during 
the first three years, have the approbation of the President and of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army. 
ARTICLE VII. 
Commander-in-chief. 
A Commander-in-Chief of the army shall be chosen by the President, 
Vice-President, a majority of the Provisional Congress, and of the 
Supreme Court, and he shall receive his commission from the 
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President, signed by the Vice-President, the Chief-Justice of the 
Supreme Court, and the Secretary of War; and he shall hold his office 
for three years, unless removed by death, or on proof of incapacity or 
misbehavior. He shall, unless under arrest (and till his place is actually 
filled as provided for by this constitution) direct all movements of the 
army, and advise with any allies. He shall, however, be tried, removed, 
or punished, on complaint of the President, by, at least, three general 
officers, or a majority of the House of Representatives, or of the 
Supreme Court; which House of Representatives (the President 
presiding); the Vice-President, and the members of the Supreme 
Court, shall constitute a court-martial, for his trial; with power to 
remove or punish, as the case may require; and to fill his place as above 
provided. 
ARTICLE VIII. 
Officers. 
A Treasurer, Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Secretary of the 
Treasury, shall each be chosen for the first three years, in the same way 
and manner as the Commander-in-Chief; subject to trial or removal on 
complaint of the President, Vice-President, or Commander in-Chief, to 
the Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court; or on complaint of the majority 
of the members of said court, or the Provisional Congress. The 
Supreme Court shall have power to try or punish either of those 
officers; and their places shall be filled as before. 
ARTICLE IX. 
Secretary of War. 
The Secretary of War shall be under the immediate direction of the 
Commander-in-Chief; who may temporarily fill his place, in case of 
arrest, or of any inability to serve. 
ARTICLE X. 
Congress or House of Representatives. 
The House of Representatives shall make ordinances providing for the 
appointment (by the President or otherwise) of all civil officers 
excepting those already named; and shall have power to make all laws 
and ordinances for the general good, not inconsistent with this 
Constitution and these ordinances. 
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ARTICLE XI. 
Appropriation of money, etc. 
The Provisional Congress shall have power to appropriate money or 
other property actually in the hands of the Treasurer, to any object 
calculated to promote the general good, so far as may be consistent 
with the provisions of this Constitution; and may in certain cases, 
appropriate, for a moderate compensation of agents, or persons not 
members of this organization, for any important service they are known 
to have rendered. 
ARTICLE XII. 
Special duties. 
It shall be the duty of Congress to provide for the instant removal of 
any civil officer or policeman, who becomes habitually intoxicated, or 
who is addicted to other immoral conduct, or to any neglect or 
unfaithfulness in the discharge of his official duties. Congress shall also 
be a standing committee of safety, for the purpose of obtaining 
important information; and shall be in constant communication with 
the Commander-in-Chief; the members of which shall each, as also the 
President, Vice-President, members of the Supreme Court, and 
Secretary of State, have full power to issue warrants returnable as 
Congress shall ordain (naming witnesses, etc.) upon their own 
information, without the formality of a complaint. Complaint shall be 
made immediately after arrest, and before trial; the party arrested to be 
served with a copy at once. 
ARTICLE XIII. 
Trial of President and other Officers. 
The President and Vice-President may either of them be tried, 
removed, or punished, on complaint made to the Chief-Justice of the 
Supreme Court, by a majority of the House of Representatives, which 
House, together with the Associate Judges of the Supreme Court, the 
whole to be presided over by the Chief-Justice in cases of the trial of the 
Vice-President, shall have full power to try such officers, to remove or 
punish as the case may require, and to fill any vacancy so occurring, the 
same as in the case of the Commander-in-Chief. 
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ARTICLE XIV. 
Trial of members of Congress. 
The members of the House of Representatives may any and all of them 
be tried, and on conviction, removed or punished, on complaint before 
the Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court, made by any number of the 
members of said House, exceeding one-third, which House, with the 
Vice-President and Associate Judges of the Supreme Court, shall 
constitute the proper tribunal, with power to fill such vacancies. 
ARTICLE XV. 
Impeachment of Judges. 
Any member of the Supreme Court tried, convicted, or punished by 
removal or otherwise, on complaint to the President, who shall, in such 
case, preside; the Vice-President, House of Representatives, and other 
members of the Supreme Court, constituting the proper tribunal (with 
power to fill vacancies); on complaint of a majority of said House of 
Representatives, or of the Supreme Court; a majority of the whole 
having power to decide. 
ARTICLE XVI. 
Duties of President and Secretary of State. 
The President, with the Secretary of State, shall immediately upon 
entering on the duties of their office, give special attention to secure 
from amongst their own people, men of integrity, intelligence, and 
good business habits and capacity; and above all, of first-rate moral and 
religious character and influence, to act as civil officers of every 
description and grade, as well as teachers, chaplains, physicians, 
surgeons, mechanics, agents of every description, clerks, and 
messengers. They shall make special efforts to induce at the earliest 
possible period, persons and families of that description, to locate 
themselves within the limits secured by this organization; and shall, 
moreover, from time to time, supply the names and residence of such 
persons to the Congress, for their special notice and information, as 
among the most important of their duties, and the President is hereby 
authorized and empowered to afford special aid to such individuals, 
from such moderate appropriations as the Congress shall be able and 
may deem it advisable to make for that object. The President and 
Secretary of State, and in cases of disagreement, the Vice-President 
shall appoint all civil officers, but shall not have power to remove any 
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officer. All removals shall be the result of a fair trial, whether civil or 
military. 
ARTICLE XVII. 
Further duties. 
It shall be the duty of the President and Secretary of State to find out 
(as soon as possible) the real friends, as well as enemies of this 
organization in every part of the country; to secure among them, inn–
keepers, private postmasters, private mail-contractors, messengers, and 
agents; through whom may be obtained correct and regular 
information, constantly; recruits for the service, places of deposit and 
sale; together with all needed supplies; and it shall be matter of special 
regard to secure such facilities through the Northern States. 
ARTICLE XVIII. 
Duty of the President. 
It shall be the duty of the President, as well as the House of 
Representatives, at all times, to inform the Commander-in-Chief of any 
matter that may require his attention, or that may affect the public 
safety. 
ARTICLE XIX. 
Duty of President—continued. 
It shall be the duty of the President to see that the provisional 
ordinances of this organization, and those made by the Congress, are 
promptly and faithfully executed; and he may in cases of great urgency 
call on the Commander-in-Chief of the army, or other officers for aid; it 
being, however, intended that a sufficient civil police shall always be in 
readiness to secure implicit obedience to law. 
ARTICLE XX. 
The Vice-President. 
The Vice-President shall be the presiding officer of the Provisional 
Congress; and in cases of tie shall give the casting vote. 
2010] John Brown’s Constitution 193 
ARTICLE XXI. 
Vacancies. 
In case of the death, removal, or inability of the President, the Vice 
President, and next to him the Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court, 
shall be the President during the remainder of the term; and the place 
of the Chief-Justice thus made vacant shall be filled by Congress from 
some of the members of said court; and the places of the Vice-President 
and Associate Justice thus made vacant, filled by an election by the 
united action of the Provisional Congress and members of the Supreme 
Court. All other vacancies, not heretofore specially provided for, shall, 
during the first three years, be filled by the united action of the 
President, Vice-President, Supreme Court, and Commander-in-Chief of 
the army. 
ARTICLE XXII. 
Punishment of crimes. 
The punishment of crimes not capital, except in case of insubordinate 
convicts or other prisoners, shall be (so far as may be) by hard labor on 
the public works, roads, etc. 
ARTICLE XXIII. 
Army appointments. 
It shall be the duty of all commissioned officers of the army to name 
candidates of merit for office or elevation to the Commander-in-Chief, 
who, with the Secretary of War, and, in cases of disagreement, the 
President, shall be the appointing power of the army; and all 
commissions of military officers shall bear the signatures of the 
Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of War. And it shall be the 
special duty of the Secretary of War to keep for constant reference of 
the Commander-in-Chief a full list of names of persons nominated for 
office, or elevation, by the officers of the army, with the name and rank 
of the officer nominating, stating distinctly but briefly the grounds for 
such notice or nomination. The Commander-in-Chief shall not have 
power to remove or punish any officer or soldier; but he may order 
their arrest and trial at any time, by court-martial. 
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ARTICLE XXIV. 
Courts-martial. 
Courts-martial for Companies, Regiments, Brigades, etc., shall be called 
by the chief officer of each command, on complaint to him by any 
officer, or any five privates, in such command, and shall consist of not 
less than five nor more than nine officers, non-commissioned officers, 
and privates, one-half of whom shall not be lower in rank than the 
person on trial, to be chosen by the three highest officers in the 
command, which officers shall not be a part of such court. The chief 
officer of any command shall, of course, be tried by a court-martial of 
the command above his own. All decisions affecting the lives of 
persons, or office of persons holding commission, must, before taking 
full effect, have the signature of the Commander-in-Chief, who may 
also, on the recommendation of, at least, one-third of the members of 
the court-martial finding any sentence, grant a reprieve or 
commutation of the same. 
ARTICLE XXV. 
Salaries. 
No person connected with this organization shall be entitled to any 
salary, pay, or emolument, other than a competent support of himself 
and family, unless it be from an equal dividend, made of public 
property, on the establishment of peace, or of special provision by 
treaty; which provision shall be made for all persons who may have 
been in any active civil or military service at any time previous to any 
hostile action for Liberty and Equality. 
ARTICLE XXVI. 
Treaties of peace. 
Before any treaty of peace shall take full effect, it shall be signed by the 
President and Vice-President, the Commander-in-Chief, a majority of 
the House of Representatives, a majority of the Supreme Court, and a 
majority of all the general officers of the army. 
ARTICLE XXVII. 
Duty of the military. 
It shall be the duty of the Commander-in-Chief and all officers and 
soldiers of the army to afford special protection when needed, to 
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Congress, or any member thereof; to the Supreme Court, or any 
member thereof; to the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, Secretary 
of State, Secretary of Treasury, and Secretary of War; and to afford 
general protection to all civil officers, or other persons having right to 
the same. 
ARTICLE XXVIII. 
Property. 
All captured or confiscated property, and all property the product of 
the labor of those belonging to this organization and of their families, 
shall be held as the property of the whole, equally, without distinction; 
and may be used for the common benefit, or disposed of for the same 
object; and any person, officer, or otherwise, who shall improperly 
retain, secrete, use, or needlessly destroy such property, or property 
found, captured, or confiscated, belonging to the enemy, or shall 
willfully neglect to render a full and fair statement of such property by 
him so taken or held, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, on 
conviction, shall be punished accordingly. 
ARTICLE XXIX. 
Safety or Intelligence Fund. 
All money, plate, watches, or jewelry, captured by honorable warfare, 
found, taken, or confiscated, belonging to the enemy, shall be held 
sacred, to constitute a liberal safety or intelligence fund; and any 
person who shall improperly retain[,] dispose of, hide, use, or destroy 
such money or other article above named, contrary to the provisions 
and spirit of this article, shall be deemed guilty of theft, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished accordingly. The Treasurer shall 
furnish the Commander-in-Chief at all times with a full statement of the 
condition of such fund and its nature. 
ARTICLE XXX. 
The Commander-in-Chief and the Treasury. 
The Commander-in-Chief shall have power to draw from the Treasury 
the money and other property of the fund provided for in Article 
twenty-ninth, but his orders shall be signed also by the Secretary of War, 
who shall keep strict account of the same; subject to examination by 
any member of Congress, or general officer. 
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ARTICLE XXXI. 
Surplus of the Safety or Intelligence Fund. 
It shall be the duty of the Commander-in-Chief to advise the President 
of any surplus of the Safety and Intelligence Fund; who shall have 
power to draw such surplus (his order being also signed by the 
Secretary of State) to enable him to carry out the provisions of Article 
Seventeenth. 
ARTICLE XXXII. 
Prisoners. 
No person, after having surrendered himself or herself a prisoner, and 
who shall properly demean himself or herself as such, to any officer or 
private connected with this organization, shall afterward be put to 
death, or be subject to any corporeal punishment, without first having 
had the benefit of a fair and impartial trial; nor shall any prisoner be 
treated with any kind of cruelty, disrespect, insult, or needless severity; 
but it shall be the duty of all persons, male and female, connected 
herewith, at all times and under all circumstances, to treat all such 
prisoners with every degree of respect and kindness that the nature of 
the circumstances will admit of; and to insist on a like course of 
conduct from all others, as in the fear of Almighty God, to whose care 
and keeping we commit our cause. 
ARTICLE XXXIII. 
Voluntaries. 
All persons who may come forward and shall voluntarily deliver up 
their slaves, and have their names registered on the Books of the 
organization, shall, so long as they continue at peace, be entitled to the 
fullest protection of person and property, though not connected with 
this organization, and shall be treated as friends, and not merely as 
persons neutral. 
ARTICLE XXXIV. 
Neutrals. 
The persons and property of all non-slaveholders who shall remain 
absolutely neutral, shall be respected so far as the circumstances can 
allow of it; but they shall not be entitled to any active protection. 
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ARTICLE XXXV. 
No needless waste. 
The needless waste or destruction of any useful property or article, by 
fire, throwing open of fences, fields, buildings, or needless killing of 
animals, or injury of either, shall not be tolerated at any time or place, 
but shall be promptly and properly punished. 
ARTICLE XXXVI. 
Property confiscated. 
The entire and real property of all persons known to be acting either 
directly or indirectly with or for the enemy, or found in arms with 
them, or found willfully holding slaves, shall be confiscated and taken, 
whenever and wherever it may be found, in either free or slave States. 
ARTICLE XXXVII. 
Desertion. 
Persons convicted, on impartial trial, of desertion to the enemy after 
becoming members, acting as spies, or of treacherous surrender of 
property, arms, ammunition, provisions, or supplies of any kind, roads, 
bridges, persons, or fortifications, shall be put to death and their entire 
property confiscated. 
ARTICLE XXXVIII. 
Violation of parole of honor. 
Persons proven to be guilty of taking up arms after having been set at 
liberty on parole of honor, or, after the same, to have taken any active 
part with or for the enemy, direct or indirect, shall be put to death and 
their entire property confiscated. 
ARTICLE XXXIX. 
All must labor. 
All persons connected in any way with this organization, and who may 
be entitled to full protection under it; shall be held as under obligation 
to labor in some way for the general good; and persons refusing, or 
neglecting so to do, shall, on conviction receive a suitable and 
appropriate punishment. 
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ARTICLE XL. 
Irregularities. 
Profane swearing, filthy conversation, indecent behavior, or indecent 
exposure of the person, or intoxication or quarreling, shall not be 
allowed or tolerated; neither unlawful intercourse of the sexes. 
ARTICLE XLI. 
Crimes. 
Persons convicted of the forcible violation of any female prisoner shall 
be put to death. 
ARTICLE XLII. 
The marriage relation—schools—the Sabbath. 
The marriage relation shall be at all times respected; and families kept 
together as far as possible; and broken families encouraged to re-unite, 
and intelligence offices established for that purpose, schools and 
churches established, as soon as may be, for the purpose of religious 
and other instructions; and the first day of the week regarded as a day 
of rest and appropriated to moral and religious instruction and 
improvement; relief of the suffering, instruction of the young and 
ignorant, and the encouragement of personal cleanliness; nor shall any 
persons be required on that day to perform ordinary manual labor, 
unless in extremely urgent cases. 
ARTICLE XLIII. 
Carry arms openly. 
All persons known to be of good character, and of sound mind and 
suitable age, who are connected with this organization, whether male 
or female, shall be encouraged to carry arms openly. 
ARTICLE XLIV. 
No person to carry concealed weapons. 
No person within the limits of the conquered territory, except regularly 
appointed policemen, express officers of the army, mail carriers, or 
other fully accredited messengers of the Congress, President, Vice-
President, members of the Supreme Court, or commissioned officers of 
the army—and those only under peculiar circumstances—shall be 
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allowed, at any time, to carry concealed weapons; and any person not 
specially authorized so to do, who shall be found so doing, shall be 
deemed a suspicious person, and may at once be arrested by any 
officer, soldier, or citizen, without the formality of a complaint or 
warrant, and may at once be subjected to thorough search, and shall 
have his or her case thoroughly investigated; and be dealt with as 
circumstances, on proof, shall require. 
ARTICLE XLV. 
Persons to be seized. 
Persons within the limits of the territory holden by this organization, 
not connected with this organization, having arms at all, concealed or 
otherwise, shall be seized at once; or be taken in charge of some 
vigilant officer; and their case thoroughly investigated; and it shall be 
the duty of all citizens and soldiers, as well as officers, to arrest such 
parties as are named in this and the preceding Section or Article, 
without the formality of complaint or warrant; and they shall be placed 
in charge of some proper officer for examination, or for safe keeping. 
ARTICLE XLVI. 
These Articles not for the overthrow of government. 
The foregoing Articles shall not be construed so as in any way to 
encourage the overthrow of any State Government, or of the General 
Government of the United States, and look to no dissolution of the 
Union, but simply to Amendment and Repeal. And our flag shall be the 
same that our Fathers fought under in the Revolution. 
ARTICLE XLVII. 
No plurality of offices. 
 
No two of the offices specially provided for, by this Instrument, shall be 
filled by the same person, at the same time. 
ARTICLE XLVIII. 
Oath. 
Every officer, civil or military, connected with this organization shall, 
before entering upon the duties of his office, make solemn oath or 
affirmation to abide by and support this Provisional Constitution and 
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these Ordinances. Also every Citizen and Soldier, before being fully 
recognized as such, shall do the same. 
Schedule. 
The President of this Convention shall convene, immediately on the 
adoption of this instrument, a convention of all such persons as shall 
have given their adherence, by signature, to the constitution, the 
President of this convention presiding, and issuing commissions to such 
officers elect; all such officers being thereafter elected in the manner 
provided in the body of this instrument. 
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Appendix B 
JOHN BROWN’S COVENANT FOR THE ENLISTMENT OF HIS 
VOLUNTEER-REGULAR COMPANY. August, 1856 
—Kansas Territory, A.D. 1856 
 
I. The Covenant. 
We whose names are found on these & the next following pages do 
hereby enlist ourselves to serve in the Free State cause under John 
Brown as commander during the full period of time affixed to our 
names respectively: and we severally pledge our word and sacred honor 
to said Commander; and to each other, that during the time for which 
we have enlisted we will faithfully and punctually perform our duty (in 
such capacity or place as may be assigned to us by a Majority of all the 
votes of those associated with us or of the companies to which we may 
belong as the case may be) as a regular volunteer force for the 
maintenance of the rights and liberties of the Free State citizens of 
Kansas: and we further agree that as individuals we will conform to the 
by Laws of this association & that we will insist on their regular and 
punctual enforcement as a first and last duty; and in short that we will 
observe and maintain a strict an[d] thorough military discipline at all 
times until our term of service expires. 
 Names, dates of enlistment, and term of service on next Pages. 
Terms of service omitted for want of room (principally for the War.) 
 
2. Names and date of enlistment. 
Aug. 22. Wm. Partridge (imprisoned), John Salathiel, S. Z. Brown, 
 John Goodell, L.  F. Parsons, N. B. Phelps, Wm. B. Harris. 
Aug. 23. Jason Brown (son of commander; imprisoned.) 
Aug. 24. J. Benjamin (imprisoned) 
Aug. 25. Cyrus Tator, R. Reynolds (imprisoned), Noah Fraze (1st 
 Lieut.), Wm. 
 Miller, John P. Glenn, Wm. Quick, M.D. Lane, Amos 
 Alderman, August 
 Bondie, Charles Kaiser (murdered Aug. 30), 
 Freeman Austin (aged 57 years), 
 Samuel Hauser, John W. Foy, 
 Jas. H. Holmes (Capt). 
Aug. 26. Geo. Partridge (killed Aug. 30), Wm. A. Sears. 
Aug. 27. S. H. Wright. 
Aug. 29. B. Darrach (Surgeon), Saml. Farrar. 
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Sept. 8. Timothy Kelley, Jas. Andrews. 
Sept. 9. W. H. Lehman, Charles Oliver, D. H. Hurd. 
Sept. 15. Wm. F. Harris. 
Sept. 16. Saml. Geer (Commissary). 
 
3. Bylaws of the Free-State regular Volunteers of Kansas enlisted under the 
command of John Brown. 
Article 1st. Those who agree to be governed by the following articles 
& whose names are appended will be known as the Kansas 
regulars. 
Article 2d. Every officer connected with this organization (except the 
Commander already named) shall be elected by a majority of the 
members if above a Captain; & if a Captain or under a Captain, by 
a majority of the company to which they belong. 
Article 3d. All vacancies shall be filled by a vote of the majority of 
members; or companies as the case may be: & all members shall be 
alike eligible to the highest office. 
Article 4th. All trials of officers or of privates for misconduct shall be  by 
a jury of Twelve chosen by a majority of members of company or 
companies as the case may be. each Company shall try its own 
members. 
Article 5th. All valuable property taken by honorable warfare from the 
enemy, shall be held as the property of the whole company or 
companies as the case may be equally, without distinction; to be 
used for the common benefit, or be placed in the hands of 
responsible agents for sale: the proceeds to be divided as nearly 
equally amongst the company or companies capturing it as may be. 
except that no persons shall be entitled to any dividend from 
property taken before he entered service; and any person guilty of 
desertion, or convicted of gross violations of his obligations to 
those with whom he should act, whether officer or private, shall 
forfeit his interest in all dividends made after such misconduct has 
occurred. 
Article 6th. All property captured shall be delivered to the receiver of 
the force or company, as the case may be; whose duty it shall be to 
make a full inventory of the same (assisted by such person, or 
persons as may be chosen for that purpose), a copy of which shall 
be made into the books of this organization and held subject to 
examination by any member, on all suitable occasions. 
Article 7th. The Receiver shall give his receipts in a book for that 
purpose for all moneys & other property of the Regulars placed in 
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his hands and keep an inventory of the same and make copy as 
provided in Article VI. 
Article 8th. Captured articles when used for the benefit of the members 
shall be receipted for by the Commissary the same as moneyes 
placed in his hands. the receivers to hold said receipts. 
Article 9th. A disorderly retreat shall not be suffered at any time and 
every officer and private, be, and is by this article fully empowered 
to prevent the same by force if need be, & any attempt at leaving 
the ground be and during a fight is hereby declared disorderly, 
unless the consent or direction of the officer then in command 
have authorized the same. 
Article 10th. A disorderly attack or charge shall not be suffered at any 
time. 
Article 11th. When in camp a thorough watch both regular and picket 
shall be maintained both by day and by night, and visitors shall not 
be suffered to pass or repass without leave from the Captain of the 
Guard and under common or ordinary circumstances it is 
expected that the Officers will cheerfully share this service with the 
privates for examples sake. 
Article 12th. Keeping up fires or lights after dark, or firing of guns 
pistols or caps, or boisterous talking while in camp shall not be 
allowed except for fires and lights when unavoidable. 
Article 13th. When in camp neither officers nor privates shall be 
allowed to leave without consent of the Officer then in command. 
Article 14th. All uncivil, ungentlemanly, profane, vulgar talk or 
conversation shall be discountenanced. 
Article 15th. All acts of petty theft needless waste of property of the 
members or of citizens is hereby declared disorderly, together with 
all uncivil and unkind treatment of citizens or of prisoners. 
Article 16th. In all cases of capturing property, a sufficient number of 
men shall be detailed to take charge of the same, all others shall 
keep in their position. 
Article 17th. It shall at all times be the duty of the Quarter master to 
select ground for encampment subject however to the approbation 
of the commanding officer. 
Article 18th. The Commissary shall give receipts in a book for that 
purpose, for all moneys provisions, and stores put into his hands. 
Article 19th. The Officers of Companies shall see that the arms of the 
same are in constant good order and a neglect of this duty shall be 
deemed disorderly. 
Article 20th. No person after having first surrendered himself a 
prisoner shall be put to death or subjected to corporeal 
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punishment, without first having had the benefit of an impartial 
trial. 
Article 21st. A wagon master and an assistant shall be chosen for each 
Company whose duty it shall be to take a general oversight and 
care of the teams, wagons, harness and all other articles of 
property pertaining thereto: and who shall both be exempt from 
serving on guard. 
Article 22d. The ordinary use, or introduction into the camp of any 
intoxicating liquors, as a beverage: is hereby declared disorderly. 
Article 23d. A majority of Two thirds of all the Members may at any 
time alter or amend the foregoing articles. 
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Appendix C 
A DECLARATION OF LIBERTY BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF 
THE SLAVE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
When in the course of Human events, it becomes necessary for an 
oppressed People to Rise, and assert their Natural Rights, as Human 
Beings, as Native and Mutual Citizens of a free Republic, and break that 
odious yoke of oppression, which is so unjustly laid upon them by their 
fellow countrymen, and to assume among the powers of Earth the same 
equal privileges to which the Laws of Nature, and nature’s God entitle, 
them; A moderate respect for the opinions of Mankind, requires that 
they should declare the causes which incite them to this Just & worthy 
action. 
 
We hold these truths to be Self Evident; That all men are created 
Equal; That they are endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable 
rights. That among these are Life, Liberty; & pursuit of happiness . . . . 
 
The history of Slavery in the United States, is a history of injustice and 
cruelties inflicted upon the Slave in every conceivable way, and in 
barbarity not surpassed by the most savage Tribes. It is the embodiment 
of all that is Evil, and ruinous to a Nation; and subversive of all Good. 
In proof of which; facts innumerable have been submitted to the 
People, and have received the verdict and condemnation of a candid 
and Impartial World. Our Servants; Members of Congress; and other 
servants of the People, who receive exorbitant wages, from the People; 
in return for their unjust Rule, have refused to pass laws for the 
accommodation of large districts of People, unless that People, would 
relinquish the right of representation in the Legislation, a right 
inestimable of them, and formidable to tyrants only. Our President and 
other Leeches have called together legislative, or treasonable Bodies, at 
places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of our 
public records; for the sole purpose of fatigueing us into compliance 
with their measures. They have desolved Representative houses, for 
opposing with manly firmness, their invasions of the rights of the 
people. 
 
They have refused to grant Petitions presented by numerous and 
respectable Citizens, asking redress of grivances imposed upon us, 
demanding our Liberty and natural rights. With contempt they spurn 
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our humble petitions; and have failed to pass laws for our relief. . . . 
They have abdicated government among us, by declaring us out of 
their protection, and waging a worse than cruel war upon us 
continually. 
 
The facts and full description of the enormous sin of Slavery, may be 
found in the General History of American Slavery, which is a history of 
repeated injuries, of base hypocracy; A cursed treasonable, usurpation; 
The most abominable provoking atrocities; which are but a mockery of 
all that is Just, or worthy of any people. Such cruelty, tyrany, and 
perfidy, has hardly a parallel, in the history of the most barbarous ages. 
 
Our Servants, or Law makers; are totally unworthy the name of Half 
Civilized Men. All their National acts, (which apply to slavery,) are false, 
to the words Spirit, and intention, of the Constitution of the United 
States, and the Declaration of Independence. . . . 
 
In every stage of these oppressions, we have petitioned for redress, in 
the most humble terms, Our repeated petitions have been answered 
only by repeated Injury. A Class of oppressors, whose character is thus 
marked by every act which may define a Tyranical Despotism, is unfit to 
rule any People. Nor have we been wanting in attention, to our 
oppressors; We have warned them from time to time, of attempts 
(made by their headlong Blindness,) to perpetrate, extend, strengthen, 
and revive the dieing eliments of this cursed Institution. We have 
reminded them of our unhappy condition, and of their Cruelties. We 
have appealed to their native Justice and magnanimity, we have 
conjured them by the ties of our common nature, our Brotherhood, & 
common Parentage, to disavow these usurpations, which have 
destroyed our Kindred friendship, and endangered their safety. They 
have been Deaf to the voice of Justice & Consanguinity. We must 
therefore acquiece in the necessity, which denounces their tyrany & 
unjust rule over us. Declaring that we will serve them no longer as 
slaves, knowing that the “Laborer is worthy of his hire.” We therefore, 
the Representatives of the circumscribed citizens of the United States, 
of America in General Congress assembled, appealing to the supreme 
Judge of the World, for the rectitude of our intentions, Do in the name, 
& by authority of the oppressed Citizens of the Slave States, Solemnly 
publish and Declare: that the Slaves are, & of right ought to be as free 
& and independent as the unchangable Law of God, requires that All 
Men Shall be. That they are absolved from all allegiance to those 
Tyrants, who still presist in forcibly subjecting them to perpetual 
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Bondage, and that all friendly connection between them & such 
Tyrants, is, & ought to be totally desolved, And that as free, & 
independent citizens of these states, they have a perfect right, a 
sufficient & just cause, to defend themselves against the tyrany of their 
oppressors. To solicit aid from & ask the protection of all true friends of 
humanity & reform, of whatever nation, & wherever found; A right to 
contract Alliances, & to do all other acts & things which free 
independent Citizens may of right do. And for the support of 
Declaration; with a firm reliance on the protection of Devine 
Providence; We mutually Pledge to each other, Our Lives, and Our 
Sacred Honor. Indeed; I tremble for my Country, when I reflect; that 
God is Just; And that his Justice; will not sleep forever &c. &c. Nature is 
morning for its murdered, and Afflicted Children. Hung be the 
Heavens in Scarlet. 
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